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A COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
DEVELOPMENT OF KOREA AND INDONESIA: HISTORICAL-
STRUCTURALISTS EXPLANATION 
 
By 
 
Poppy Sulistyaning Winanti 
 
  
The state in Korea and Indonesia played a crucial role in economic 
development. It reflected on the choice of strategy and development plan, the role of 
technocrats, and the relationship between government and big businesses. However, 
the result is different. Indonesia’s economic development was not as successful as that 
of Korea’s. This thesis compares divergent political economy of development between 
Korea and Indonesia. 
In explaining the divergence, the writer utilizes the historical-structuralists 
argument. This argument identifies macro-historical forces and their conjunctural 
dynamics to the political economy of development. It includes state and social 
formation, colonial legacies, and geo-politics.  
The findings, based on state and social formation, indicate that the different 
result of Korea’s and Indonesia’s state intervention was due to; first, the political 
leadership commitment to economic development in Indonesian case was only a 
political jargon and was not followed by the concrete executive action as we can find 
in Korea. Second, Indonesia did not have a rational and competent bureaucracy as 
Korea had, rather a rent-seeking bureaucracy. Third, the military in Indonesia has an 
enormous role not only in politic but also in the economy, while this condition did not 
appear in Korean case. Clearly, by analyzing the role of the state, the writer argues 
that Korea consistently follows the expectation of the developmental state model, 
whereas, Indonesia does not. 
Another findings, based on colonial legacy experience and geo-political 
situation, show that; first, in spite of the harsh experience during the Japanese colonial 
rule, the Japanese colonial legacy in Korea contributed for providing positive initial 
condition for economic development in the post-colonial period. While in Indonesian 
case, instead of providing positive contribution for economic development, Dutch 
colonial legacy inherited “the ethnic division of labor”, which resulted in ethnic 
disparities in income and wealth, also rent-seeking activity. This is eventually 
hindered the economic development process in the postcolonial period. Second, 
Korea’s geo-political and international systemic situation, which resulted in the U.S. 
assistance, also contributed to the successful Korean economic development.  
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
A. Introduction  
 
In the early 1960s, Indonesia and South Korea (hereafter: Korea) were 
among the poorest countries in the world. After the military regime seized the power 
(1961 in Korea and 1965 in Indonesia), both countries started their economic 
development, which were characterized by high state intervention. In pursuing 
economic goal, state in two cases is not only defining and generating national 
economic plan but also has a very significant role in its implementation. 
However, Indonesia’s economic development was not as successful as that of 
Korea’s. Indonesia’s GNP per capita in 1999 was only US$ 580 while Korea’s 
recorded US$ 8,490 (The World Bank Data, 2000). Korea became a member of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1995, while 
Indonesia still remains a troubled developing country.  
This thesis proposes to examine the divergent political economy of 
development between Korea and Indonesia. It will be based on the questions of why 
the state intervention in two cases has different result and what kinds of circumstances 
determine the successful economic development in Korea. In answering those 
questions, the writer’s assessment will be based on historical-structuralists 
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explanation.  
Historical-structuralists identify macro-historical forces and their 
conjunctural dynamics to the political economy of development (Chung In Moon and 
Yong Cheol Kim (in Leftwich, ed., 1996): p.141). It includes state and social 
formation, colonial legacies, and geo-politics.  
This explanation recognizes how state actively shaped economic 
development process.  The term that has been used to explain the role of government 
on economic development is developmental state1. This explanation argues that the 
effective strategic intervention should be ensured by a strong political leadership 
commitment and the existence of competent, rational, and meritocratic bureaucracy 
(Chung In Moon and Young Cheol Kim (in Leftwich ed., 1996): p.141). Besides the 
important role of the state, this explanation also argues that some circumstances, such 
as colonial legacies and geo-political situation might contribute to the economic 
development process. 
 
B. The Method and Strategies of the Research 
 
 This thesis constitutes a comparative historical research. As Ragin points out, 
                                                          
1 The term can be used synonymously with “state-guided capitalism” (Johnson: 2000), “state led-
growth”, “state-led capitalist development” (Burket and Landsberg: 2000), or “dirigisme” (Hun Joo 
Park: forthcoming), Austin recognizes it as “strategic pragmatism” (Austin: 2001). 
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comparative research can be defined as one that compares large social units, nations, 
societies, states, cities, or countries (Ragin (in Stark and Roberts, 1998): p. 127). 
There are two types of comparative research; the case-oriented approach and the 
variable-oriented approach. According to Stark and Roberts, the variable-oriented 
approach tests the hypotheses by applying statistical techniques such as correlation 
and regression to variables based on an appropriate set of aggregate case. Meanwhile, 
the case-oriented approach selects two or more cases and examines them closely in 
order to explain some striking difference or differences between (or among) them 
(Stark and Roberts, 1998: p. 183 - 184).  
The primary difference between comparative research and other social 
research methods, like survey and experiment lies in how to obtain data. While other 
methods can collect data through experiment, interview, questionnaire, or observation, 
comparative research primarily obtains data through document or library research. 
This thesis is comparative research, based on the case-oriented approach. Its primary 
source is in English and Indonesian languages. 
 
C. The Plan of Study 
This thesis consists of five sections. Chapter 2 presents an overview of 
Korean and Indonesian political economy of development. It emphasizes on political 
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structure and the state intervention in economic development. This chapter concludes 
that state in both cases has a central role in economic development. However, both 
cases ended up with different result. Korea can be regarded as a successful case while 
Indonesia as a failure case of the state intervention in economic development. 
Explaining the divergent performance forms the topic of the next chapter.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the different feature of the role of the state in two cases. 
This section pays attention to the political leadership commitment, the role of 
bureaucracy, and military. This part argues that the strong and long lasting political 
leadership commitment to economic development and the existence of a clean, 
competent, and responsible bureaucracy, contributed to the successful state 
intervention in Korean case.  
Chapter 4 analyzes what kinds of historical and international circumstances 
determine successful state intervention in economic development. It examines the 
colonial legacy experience and geo-political situation. This chapter assumes that 
colonial legacy and geo-political situation contributed for providing positive initial 
condition for Korean economic development. Finally, chapter 5 sums up the thesis 
with some concluding remarks.  
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Chapter II 
Korean and Indonesian Political Economy of Development: An 
Overview  
 
A. Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of Korean and Indonesian political 
economy of development. It elaborates the state’s role in both cases by emphasizing 
on political structure and the state intervention in economic development.  
Like many other comparative studies, this thesis faces the difficulties that 
come from historical, cultural, and structural differences between the two countries. 
The first problem is the great difference in the size of two countries. With a 
population of 209 million people in 2000, Indonesia is now the fourth largest country 
in the world, following China, India, and United States2—whereas Korea has only 
46.8 million people.  
Two countries also have a difference in cultural aspect. It is an undeniable 
fact that Indonesia is a multicultural country. As an archipelago country with 17,508 
islands 3 , Indonesia consists more than hundreds of ethnic groups and languages 
compared to the homogeneous Korean people who speak one language and share the 
same culture. Geopolitically, two countries are also different. As is well known, Korea 
                                                          
2 Setiawan, Bakti. “Indonesia”. http://www.iar.ubc.ca/centres/csear/SSN/ch2.pdf    
3 According to the Indonesian Naval Hydro-Oceanographic office in Indonesian government official 
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has been blessed by geopolitics. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s position is not as important 
as that of Korea’s. Another difference between two countries concerns with natural 
resources. Indonesia has been blessed with rich natural resources; on the other hand, 
Korea can be categorized as a country with relatively poor natural resources.  
Those differences make this cross-country comparison difficult since they 
have a different influence to the economic development performance of the two states. 
Some of those variables are giving a positive contribution to the economic 
development of one state, whilst, the same influence can not be found in its 
counterpart. The cultural diversity in Indonesia, for example, influenced the 
characteristic of colonial legacies, which resulted in ethnic division of labor.4 While 
this condition was not found in Korean case.  
Due to its rich natural resources, Indonesia was able to initiate economic 
growth by exploiting its abundant reserves of land and natural resources, including 
petroleum, natural gas, tin, and timber. Indonesian export industry, particularly during 
its rapid growth period in 1971 – 1981, was mostly dependent on natural resources 
export such as oil. Meanwhile in Korean case, its export mostly was a manufacturing 
industry or high-technology industry. 
Nevertheless, with a careful examination, two countries also have some 
                                                                                                                                                                      
website http://www.ri.go.id  
4 I will explain further this topic on chapter 4. 
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similarities, which makes this comparative study feasible and important. Historically 
both countries had colonization experience even though under different colonial rule 
and different impact to the post-colonial economic development. Dutch colonized 
Indonesia for more than hundreds years and then Japanese for three and a half years, 
meanwhile Korea from 1910 – 1945 was under Japanese colonial rule.  
The economic development of the two countries was characterized by a very 
high state intervention. As Burket and Landsberg point out, Korea, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand were generally seen to be following the Japanese model. 
Their rapid growth and industrial transformations appeared to confirm the 
characteristics of state-led capitalist development (Burket and Landsberg, 2000: p. 5).  
Furthermore, two countries also achieved rapid economic growth under the 
authoritarian regime; Indonesia under Soeharto regime and Korea under Park Chung 
Hee and had continued under Chun Doo Hwan. Both Soeharto and Park justified their 
military coup 5  with the prevalent government corruption, economic despair and 
starvation, and the threat of communism.6 Both leaders, indeed, promised to bring the 
country out of economic backwardness. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: the next part analyzes a 
                                                          
5 In Indonesian case, the military coup in 1966 is still debatable. Seoharto’s regime always denied that 
there was a military coup in 1966. However, there are some evidences mostly provided by American 
scholars indicating that there was a military coup in 1966 led by Soeharto. 
6 In case of Korea, there was a constant, real, and perceived military threat from the North (Hun Joo 
Park: forthcoming). 
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comparative development performance of both countries. It shows a big difference in 
economic development achievement of both countries. The following part examines 
Korean and Indonesian political economy development experiences. It analyzes the 
state intervention in economic development and political structure.  
 
B. Comparative Development Performance  
 
In 1979 the difference between Korea’s GDP and Indonesia’s was not so 
wide. Korea’s GDP was only US$ 64.6 while Indonesia’s was US$ 55.1. However, in 
1989 when both countries were recognized as a High-Performing Asian Economies, 
Korea’s GDP had already two times of Indonesia’s was. Korea’s GDP had already 
reached US$ 221.2 while Indonesia’s was only US$ 101.5 with the average annual 
growth from 1979 – 1989, 6.0 for Indonesia and 8.6 for Korea. In 1999 after the 
financial crisis, the gap between Korea’s GDP and Indonesia’s was even wider. It 
showed that Korea was more successful to cope with the crisis compared with 
Indonesia.  
Based on their structure of the economy, it shows that Indonesia still relies on 
agricultural sector compares to Korean case, which mostly was based on industrial 
and the manufacturing sectors. Agriculture sector contributed 27.3% for Indonesia’s 
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GDP in 1979, and it only contributed 18.6% for Korea’s. In 1999, there was no 
significant change in Indonesian case, while there was quite significant change in the 
Korean case. It was still 17.3% of Indonesia’s GDP earned from agriculture, whereas 
it was only 5% of Korea’s. It is clear that by standard of socio-economic measures, 
Indonesia’s development performance was relatively poorer compared to that of 
Korea’s. 
 
Table 2.1. The Starting Point and the Initial Conditions in 1965 
 
Country Population GDP per 
Capita 
Trade 
Share (% 
of GDP) 
Agriculture 
(% of GDP)
Urban % Ethnic 
Diversity 
Life 
Expectancy
Indonesia 104m 608 0.24 0.53 0.16 0.76 43 
Korea 29m 1058 0.27 0.36 0.32 0 55 
 
Notes: GDP per capita is PPP (Power Purchasing Parity) adjusted and measured in 
international dollars (1985 base year). The trade share is imports plus exports as a share of 
GDP. The trade share and agriculture share are 3-year averages (1964-66) when sufficient 
data are available. 
Source: Modified from Temple, “Growing into Trouble: Indonesia after 1966”, Discussion 
Paper Series No. 2932. 
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Table 2.2. Basic Indicators in Social and Economic Development 
 
Indicators Indonesia Korea
POVERTY and SOCIAL 1999 
Population, mid-year (millions)  207.0 46.8
GNP per capita (Atlas method, US$) 580 8,490
GNP (Atlas method, US$ billions)  120.1 397.9
Average annual growth, 1993-99 
Population (%)  1.6 1.0
Labor force (%)  2.7 2.0
Most recent estimate (latest year available, 1993-99) 
Poverty (% of population below national poverty 
line)  
20 …
Urban population (% of total population)  35 81
Life expectancy at birth (years)  65 73
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births)  43 9
Child malnutrition (% of children under 5) 34 …
Access to improved water source (% of population) 62 83
Illiteracy (% of population age 15+) 14 2
Gross primary enrollment (% of school-age 
population)  
113 94
Male  115 94
Female  110 94
 
Source: World Bank Data 2000
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Table 2.3. Key Economic Ratios and Long-Term Trends 
 
Indonesia Korea Indicators 
 1979 1989 1998 1999  1979 1989 1998 1999 
GDP (US$ 
billions) 
 55.1 101.5 98.8 151.2  64.6 221.2 317.1 406.9 
Gross domestic 
investment/GDP  
 24.8 29.1 20.0 13.1  36.0 34.3 21.2 26.8 
Exports of goods 
and services/GDP 
 30.6 25.1 51.2 34.9  27.2 32.0 49.4 42.1 
Gross domestic 
savings/GDP  
 32.8 32.8 29.4 21.0  28.7 36.4 34.5 33.7 
Gross national 
savings/GDP 
 … 23.9 24.9 13.9  28.3 36.7 34.0 33.0 
Current account 
balance/GDP 
 … -1.6 4.7 4.2  -6.4 2.4 12.9 6.1 
Interest 
payments/GDP 
 1.9 3.3 5.7 4.8  1.7 0.9 1.6 1.5 
Total debt/GDP  33.8 58.5 152.7 97.5  35.4 14.8 46.9 33.4 
Total debt 
service/exports 
 … 37.5 34.7 37.9  15.4 12.0 12.2 22.6 
Present value of 
debt/GDP 
 … … 146.4 …  … … 42.6 … 
Present value of 
debt/exports 
 … … 264.9 …  … … 81.3 … 
(average annual 
growth) 
1979-
89 
1989-99 1998 1999 1999-03 1979-
89 
1989-
99 
1998 1999 1999-03
GDP 6.0 5.3 -13.0 0.3 3.4 8.6 6.1 -6.7 10.7 6.7 
GNP per capita 3.9 3.4 -17.8 0.4 2.6 7.5 4.9 -8.4 10.1 … 
Exports of goods 
and services 
1.4 6.9 11.2 -31.6 7.7 12.5 14.8 113.2 16.3 9.6 
STRUCTURE of 
the ECONOMY 
(% of GDP) 
 1979 1989 1998 1999  1979 1989 1998 1999 
Agriculture  27.3 21.7 17.0 17.3  18.6 9.4 4.9 5.0 
Industry   37.7 38.3 42.7 43.1  38.8 42.8 43.8 43.5 
Manufacturing   11.7 19.7 24.1 25.4  27.2 30.7 30.9 31.8 
Services  35.0 40.0 40.3 39.6  42.5 47.7 51.2 51.5 
Private 
consumption 
 57.6 58.5 65.1 72.5  61.0 53.1 54.6 56.3 
General 
government 
consumption 
 9.5 8.7 5.5 6.5  10.3 10.5 11.0 10.1 
Imports of goods 
and services 
 22.6 21.4 41.7 26.9  34.4 30.0 36.1 35.3 
(average annual  1979-89 1989- 1998 1999  1979- 1989- 1998 1999 
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growth) 99 89 99 
Agriculture  3.4 2.5 -0.7 2.1  2.7 1.9 -6.6 4.7 
Industry  6.5 7.2 -14.0 1.2  11.1 6.7 -7.5 13.0 
Manufacturing  13.0 8.2 -11.4 2.6  12.4 7.3 -7.4 21.8 
Services  7.0 4.7 -16.4 -1.4  8.3 6.1 -6.0 9.4 
Private 
consumption 
 6.5 7.3 -6.3 3.7  8.1 5.5 -11.3 9.4 
General 
government 
consumption 
 5.3 0.8 -15.4 0.7  4.7 3.6 -0.4 -0.6 
Gross domestic 
investment 
 6.7 3.9 -34.6 -20.0  9.1 10.4 -22.4 28.9 
Imports of goods 
and services 
 1.8 8.5 -5.3 -40.7  9.0 10.4 -22.4 28.9 
Gross national 
product 
 5.9 5.1 -16.5 2.0  8.8 6.0 -7.5 11.0 
Source: World Bank Data 2000  
 
C. The Gist of Two Cases  
1. The State Intervention in Economic Development 
a. The Choice of Development Strategy  
Under the government-led strategy 7 , the commitment on economic 
development in Korean case was manifested into a plan-rational development 
strategy 8 . This plan-rational development strategy, in turn, was translated into 
economic actions and policies such as the adoption of an outward-looking 
                                                          
7 Amsden describes government-led strategy in Korean case as “Getting prices wrong”, due to 
excessive role of the state in economic development through subsidy, protection, and price control 
(Amsden, 1989). However, rather than seeing it as “Getting prices wrong” SaKong argues Korean 
government role in economic development was to get relative prices right (SaKong, 1993: p. 38). 
8 According to SaKong, a nation’s development strategy can be characterized in various ways. It is 
often described as “outward-looking” or “export led” versus “inward-oriented” or “import-substitution 
driven”. If its primary emphasis is on sectoral growth, it is sometimes categorized as “industry-led” or 
as slanted toward “agricultural-first”. From a growth versus equity point of view, development strategy 
can be characterized as either “growth-first” or “equity-first”. Sometimes, the “growth-first” 
characterization is made to emphasize that the weight of the nation’s strategy is put toward “growth 
maximization” rather than “economic stabilization”. Depending on the way the chosen strategy is 
implemented, the pattern of a nation’s development can be described as either “government-led” or 
    13
industrialization, active inducement of foreign capital, various institutional reforms, 
industry-led, and growth-first or growth maximization.  
The focus on growth-first or growth maximization and redistribution-later 
strategy in the early stage of Korean development process can be found in Park’s 
statement: 
We cannot expect the whole draught-stricken paddy land to become 
evenly watered immediately after we start to water it. We ought to 
have the patience and wisdom to share ten bushels later than the 
impatience and ignorance to insist on sharing a package of seeds 
evenly now. (President Park Chung Hee, 1967 (in SaKong, 1993): p. 
44). 
Concerning the outward-looking development strategy, which is usually 
described as manifesting either “export promotion” or “trade liberalization” was 
adopted since the early 1960s (SaKong, 1993: p. 27-28). Under this strategy, Korea 
introduced very active export promotion schemes in the early 1960s by providing 
various new fiscal and financial subsidies, correcting overvaluation of the local 
currency, allowing exporters to import export-related raw materials and capital 
equipment freely, and introducing generous wastage allowances for export-related 
production. These measures, in fact, were designed to offset the existing import-
substitution biases (SaKong, 1993: p. 38).  
However, the “industry neutral incentive” under the export promotion 
                                                                                                                                                                      
“private sector-led” (SaKong, 1993: p. 24). 
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strategy was changing into the “industrial targeting approach”, when the government 
launched the Heavy Chemical Industry (HCI) drive policy in January 1973. Under the 
HCI drive only certain selected industries were promoted. The specific industries as 
an “important” or “key” so-called “strategic industries” included iron and steel, 
nonferrous metals, general machinery, shipbuilding, petrochemicals, electrical 
equipment, and other industries designated by the president. They were promoted by 
providing strong tax incentives and preferential credits (SaKong, 1993: p. 42).  
There were several reasons behind the HCI drives; first, there was rapid 
increase in exports of light manufactures by China and Southeast Asian countries, 
which can be seen as a threat for Korean competitiveness at the same industry. Second, 
there was a rising protectionism in industrial country against labor-intensive products 
(SaKong, 1993; Jung Ho Yoo, 2001). The third reason related with a security matter. 
In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the United States announced the Nixon doctrine 
and US troops stationed in Korea were reduced by a third in 1971. The reduction in 
US ground troops stationed in Korea as the beginning of an eventual overall US troop 
withdrawal from the Korean peninsula. Consequently, security concerns prompted the 
promotion of heavy industries in particular as the foundation for a strong defense 
industry (SaKong, 1993: p. 42). 
Indonesian political economy of development has been transformed 
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significantly after Soeharto took power in 1966. The central issue in the beginning of 
Soeharto regime 9  was how to improve government ability to achieve economic 
growth and political stability. By placing economic growth as one of the national 
goals, the regime wanted to prove that they paid more attention on economic matter 
contrary with the previous regime, which paid more attention to political problem and 
neglected economic problem. In order to achieve these goals, the New Order regime 
chose “outward orientation” as an economy strategy and “authoritarianism” as a 
political strategy (Mas’oed, 1994: p. 33-34).  
The “outward orientation” strategy was chosen in order to overcome economic 
problems, inherited from the previous regime, such as economic stagnation, 
hyperinflation, and foreign debt. This strategy was also taken to promote domestic 
entrepreneurship, to accumulate foreign and domestic capital, to earn foreign loan, to 
create conducive circumstances for “free-trade” and to attract foreign investment.  
Another important economic policy was promoting industrialization10. The 
                                                          
9 Soeharto regime can be used synonymously with the ‘New Order’ regime in contrast to the ‘Old 
Order’ of the Soekarno government.  
10 According to Chandra industrialization refers to an increase in the share of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) contributed by the manufacturing sector. It is a process that involves a change in the 
structure, or make-up, of the economy (Chandra, 1992: p.4). Meanwhile, manufacturing is a subgroup 
within the industrial category. It refers to activities that transform or combine materials into new 
products to make them more valuable (in terms of money earned from them) or more useful (Chandra, 
1992: p. 6). 
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industrialization strategy was divided into three phases (The Kian Wie, 1994: p. 28 – 
35): the first was the import-substitution industrialization (ISI), which emphasized 
fiscal policy to reduce import and provide a favorable circumstance for the promotion 
of domestic industry. The second phase is the second stage of import-substitution 
industrialization, which started to promote the manufacturing industry. The third 
phase was characterized by export-oriented strategy or export-oriented 
industrialization (EOI). This strategy was adopted after the period of oil boom at the 
end of 1970s. 
    
b. The Economic Development Plan 
 The government in two cases also introduced a five-year economic 
development plan. Korea’s first five-year economic development plan was introduced 
in 1962. Its introduction marked a new era in Korean economic history in the sense 
that, for the first time, the government provided a national economic vision and an 
economic program for business and the general public (SaKong, 1993: p. 48). The 
second five-year economic development plan was implemented in 1967 – 1971, the 
third (1972 – 1976), the fourth (1977 – 1981), the fifth (1982 – 1986), and the revised 
sixth (1988 – 1991). 
SaKong points out Korean planning can be described as more indicative than 
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imperative in the sense that the process of planning serves a greater purpose than the 
complete plans themselves. In the course of the preparation of the plans, a substantial 
amount of information is shared among all participants. Participants from the private 
sector get the opportunity to learn more about the policy direction of the government 
and the government’s perspective on future economic environments. Planning has 
facilitated highly critical inter-ministerial cooperation and coordination in formulating 
and implementing short-term economic policies, which are the real driving force of 
the economy (SaKong, 1993: p. 49). 
The broader level of Indonesian development strategy can be found in The 
Broad Outline of Government Policy (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN), 
which was institutionalized in the development planning program. Indonesian 
development planning programs are formulated according to three different time 
periods11: 
a. Planning for long-term period (Pembangunan Jangka Panjang, PJP) 
with 25-year period. 
b. Medium-term development planning with five-year period. As is well-
known as the five-year development plans (Rencana Pembangunan Lima 
Tahun, Repelita12). 
                                                          
11 http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/gems/eeo/program/indonesi/ms.htm   
12 Since 1999 Repelita has become Propenas (Program Pembangunan Nasional or National 
Development Program). 
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c. Short-term planning as in the state budget 
These development planning programs are based on three fundamental 
principles of development philosophy referred to as “trilogy of development” (trilogi 
pembangunan), that is, equity of distribution of wealth, economic growth, and 
national (political) stability aimed at achieving social well-being and justice for the 
people.  
Indonesia has already implemented the first PJP (1969 – 1994), which placed 
economic growth as the first priority. The implementation of the first PJP was divided 
into 5 Repelita; Repelita I (1969 – 1974), Repelita II (1974 – 1979), Repelita III (1979 
– 1984), Repelita IV (1984 – 1989), Repelita V (1989 – 1994). 
 
Table 2.4. Repelita in the First PJP and the Priority of Development  
Repelita The Priority of Development 
Repelita I 1. National Stability 
2. Economic Growth 
3. Equity of distribution of wealth 
Repelita II 1. Economic Growth 
2. National Stability 
3. Equity of Distribution of Wealth 
Repelita III 1. Equity of Distribution of Wealth 
2. Economic Growth 
3. National Stability 
Repelita IV 1. Increasing the standard of living, intelligence, overall well 
being, and the equity of distribution of wealth 
2. Providing the strong fundamental for the next Repelita   
Repelita V 1. Increasing the standard of living, intelligence, overall well 
being, and the equity of distribution of wealth 
2. Providing the strong fundamental for the next Repelita   
 
Sources: GBHN various years 
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Repelita is very important in understanding Indonesian political economy of 
development for a number of reasons. First, the genesis and formulation of these 
development plans were carried out under the influence of IMF. Second, the changing 
emphasis in Indonesian economic development policy can be traced in them. Third, 
the discourse of nationalism is a feature of the plans. Fourth, the importance given to 
the concept of development in Indonesia during this period is symbolized in the 
relationship between these Development Plans and the Development Cabinets, as they 
have been called since 1968.13 
 
c. Institution Innovation 
Regarding the implementation of development strategies, Park Chung Hee 
established and reformed some important economic institutions. The most important 
institutional innovation was the creation of the powerful Economic Planning Board in 
July 1961. The deputy Prime Minister was appointed as the head of the board. This 
was signifying the importance attached to economic policy coordination (SaKong, 
1993: p. 26). This board had a role to formulate, implement, and monitor the 
government’s industrialization strategy. The board subsequently developed into a 
                                                          
13 McCormack, Brian. (1999). “Fifty Years of Indonesian Development: “One Nation” Under 
Capitalism…” Journal of World-Systems Research http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/jwsr.htm.5:48-73  
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powerful bureaucratic organization, responsible for development planning and 
policymaking. In this capacity, it coordinated the functions of the ministries of 
Finance, Commerce and Industry, Transportation, Agriculture, Health and Social 
Affairs, and Science and Technology (Yoon Hyung Kim (in Lee-Jay Cho and Yoon 
Hyung Kim, eds.,1994): p. 49).  
In addition, in order to mobilize domestic resources, the government 
established a National Taxation Administration Office in 1965 (SaKong, 1993: p. 26). 
The third institutional rearrangement related to the nation’s financial system. At that 
time, commercial banks were made into de facto public enterprises by legally limiting 
private voting rights. Furthermore, various state-owned special banks were 
established, and existing special banks were expanded specifically to accommodate 
development (SaKong, 1993: p. 26).  
Concerning the implementation of the export promotion, the government’s 
active participation in export promotion culminated in the monthly export promotion 
meeting, attended by the president, top government policy makers, and business and 
financial leaders. The government’s role in providing information regarding markets 
abroad and in helping to find new business opportunities was also important, 
particularly at the early stage of export promotion. The Korean government 
established the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) and the Korea Trading 
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Corporation (Koryo Mu Yeuk) to help small and medium-sized companies overcome 
their limited capabilities in overseas markets and increase their exports (SaKong, 
1993: p. 39). 
If Korea has a very influential institution in formulating economic 
development plan, like Economic Planning Board (EPB), Indonesia in a similar way 
has the National Planning Agency (Badan Perencana Pembangunan Nasional, 
Bappenas), which had a very significant role in designing, defining, and formulating 
Repelita. Other important institutions relating with economic development plan are 
Regional Planning Boards (Badan Perencana Pembangunan Daerah, Bappeda) and 
the Planning Agencies (Biro Perencanaan) in many government departments.  
According to McCawley and Rudner, Bappenas policy provided a protective 
framework for the emergence of domestic capital dominated by state corporations and 
by companies owned by the military and their domestic Chinese corporate clients 
(Robison, 1986: p. 133). The major writings of the Bappenas technocrats in the early 
stage of the New Order’s economic development effort were concerned primarily with 
concrete problems of growth, currency stabilization, and rehabilitation of the 
infrastructure (Robison, 1986: p. 133).   
The principal duties and functions of Bappenas are determined in Presidential 
Decree No.35 Year 1973, on the National Development Planning Agency, as 
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variously amended in Presidential Decree No.19 Year 1983, Presidential Decree No.7 
Year 1988, and most recently by Presidential Decree No.73 Year 1993. Essentially, 
these amendments concern the organizational arrangement, work procedures, position, 
main duties and permanent functions, as stipulated in Presidential Decree No.35 Year 
1973; these are: 14 
a. To formulate short-term, medium-term, and long-term national development 
plans.  
b. To coordinate planning, endeavoring to harmonize sectoral and regional 
portions, and to create integration in such planning within the national 
development plan.  
c. In conjunction with the Ministry of Finance to formulate the State Budget.  
d. In conjunction with the related institutions, to formulate credit and capital 
investment policies.  
e. In conjunction with the related institutions, to formulate policies for the receipt 
and use of foreign loans and assistance.  
f. To monitor the preparation and conduct of national development planning, as 
well as efforts to synchronize its programs and projects.  
                                                          
14 http://www.bappenas.go.id/bap_eng.html 
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g. To appraise the implementation of the national development plan, with 
consideration to the requirements of its programs and projects.  
h. To conduct survey and research necessary to evaluate the performance of 
planning tasks, as well as for appraisal of the national development.  
i. To conduct other activities as directed by the President.  
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d. The Role of Big Businesses and Technocrats 
In the process of formulating and implementing the development strategy, the 
role of the government could not be separated from the role of technocrat. As Nam 
Duck Woo states the technocrats played an important role in Korea’s economic 
management (Nam Duck Woo in Seung Yeung Kwack, ed., 1994: p.17). Many 
Korean technocrats were trained abroad, especially in the United States. Their primary 
role was to translate the major policy objectives of the top leaders into concrete 
actions in a way compatible with the working of the economic system (Nam Duck 
Woo (in Seung Yeung Kwack, ed., 1994): p.17). 
Another important thing in the process of implementing the development 
strategy is the role of big businesses. Amsden underlines one of the key successful 
indicators of Korean economic development was that the actions of the Korean state 
have been complemented by those large, diversified business groups that have come 
to occupy a dominant position in the economy (Amsden (in Wade, 1992): p. 285). In 
order to foster economic growth, the state not only actively promotes the growth of 
the business group, so-called chaebol15, it also disciplines their use of subsidies and 
                                                          
15 SaKong defines a Chaebol in Korea as a group of firms owned and controlled primarily by a single 
entrepreneur and usually his family members (SaKong, 1993: p. 61). Similarly, Eun Mee Kim 
describes Chaebol as a large, family-owned and family-managed business group (Eun Mee Kim, 1997: 
p.3). Meanwhile, Burkett and Landsberg define Chaebol as a family-run industrial and financial 
conglomerate enterprise (Burkett and Landsberg, 2000: p. 17). 
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other supports, rewarding those who use subsidies “well” with further help and 
withdrawing support from those who do not (Amsden (in Wade, 1992): p. 285). In 
other words, government has a very significant role in controlling business group. 
The growth of Chaebol was also due to the implementation of HCI 
promotion policies. In implementing HCI promotion policies, the government actively 
encouraged large business groups with proven track records and financial capability 
to participate in major projects in designated industries. In any case, the result was 
rapid growth and higher debt-to-equity ratios for these groups (SaKong, 1993: p. 57). 
 A Chaebol, therefore, can be viewed as an economic group, which is defined 
as “a multi-company firm that transacts in different markets but which does so under 
common entrepreneurial and financial control”. The emergence of these chaebols as 
economic groups can be considered as an institutional innovation for overcoming 
market deficiencies and reaping their benefits, even though government policy was 
instrumental in creating and sustaining them. As previously indicated, in order to 
promote the HCIs, well-established, large entrepreneurs with good track records were 
called in to launch new ventures in targeted industries. In most cases, they received 
various subsidies and credits in return. As a result, many chaebols became further 
diversified and grew faster—much faster, in fact, than the rest of the economy 
(SaKong, 1993: p. 61). 
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As we can found in Korean case, Indonesian economic development was also 
determined by a group of economic technocrats. In September 1966, several months 
after seized the power, Soeharto appointed a ‘Team of Experts in the field of 
Economics and Finance’, consisting of the five economists from the University of 
Indonesia (Thee Kian Wee in Dick (et.al), 2002: p. 196). This appointment marked the 
authority of the so-called ‘economic technocrats’ in Indonesia. They were a group of 
Western-educated economists, often referred to as the “Berkeley Mafia” since these 
bureaucrats received Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at 
Berkeley.  From the 1960s until 1993 cabinet, this group guided the national economy 
and remained at the forefront of Indonesian policy-making as presidential councilors 
and public educators in economic affairs.  
The big businesses or conglomerates also had a significant role in Indonesian 
economic development. Big businesses grew due to government support, through 
favoring policy, such as subsidy, protection, and special privilege. However, the only 
existing private conglomerates within Indonesia even remotely capable of managing 
economic development are either closely linked to the New Order regime, ethnic 
Chinese or both (Austin, 2001: p. 86). MacIntyre indicates that business in Indonesia 
has been politically weaken by the fact that the business class is dominated by 
Chinese Indonesians, as opposed to pribumi, or indigenous Indonesians (MacIntyre, 
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1990: p.3).  
2. Political Structure 
 Political stability and social discipline are very important pre-condition for 
economic development, especially in the early stage of development. 
Authoritarianism is often regarded as a system to provide political and social stability. 
Furthermore, since governments have a very significant role in economic 
development process, it is quite easy for the governments to become authoritarian.  
According to Johnson, the liabilities of soft authoritarianism have already 
been made clear. Its strengths are that long-term developmental goals for the economy 
can be set; serious investment in education and research can be depoliticized; and 
people can come to see their government as legitimate for what it has accomplished 
rather than because of the formal political philosophy it expresses (Johnson (in Lee-
Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim, eds., 1994): p. 72). Furthermore Johnson attributes 
that the autonomy and strength of Korean state to the authoritarian governance in 
which a military-dominated single party was instrumental in mobilizing and 
allocating financial resources, disciplining civil society, and suppressing political 
opposition (Chung in Moon and Yong Cheol Kim (in Leftwich eds., 1996): p. 141). 
 Meanwhile, according to Eun Mee Kim, there is a controversy among 
developmental scholars about whether a developmental state is necessarily 
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authoritarian. However, in the case of Korea, she argues that the developmental state 
in Korea was also an authoritarian state, which refers to a style of governance 
antithetical to democracy (Eun Mee Kim, 1997: p. 29). Moreover she points out that 
in Korean economic development experience the state forcibly intervened in the 
market, the state was in control of the market, and the state was omnipresent in the 
market. The comprehensive developmental state in South Korea implemented 
economic development plans in an authoritarian manner (Eun Mee Kim, 1997: p. 37). 
 Korean political structure, during its economic growth period under Park 
Chung Hee’s regime, clearly, an authoritarian regime. Park Chung Hee declared 
martial law in 1965, 1972, and 1975 and made clear his political idea: “We can’t eat 
democracy. We have only two priorities: first, national defense; second, economic 
development”. He reinforced his presidential position under the Yushin Constitution of 
1972, which instituted a strong presidency, weakened the legislature, limited political 
activity, and restricted the press (Austin, 2001: p. 103).  
 Relating to Indonesian political structure, MacIntyre points out that under the 
New Order, the political domination of the state over society has been extended 
enormously. Soeharto, who was supported by the armed forces, moved firmly and 
persistently to limit political participation and to concentrate power (MacIntyre, 1990: 
p. 2). The 1945 constitution provided Soeharto with the power to appoint all key 
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executive and judicial positions within the Indonesian State. Through these 
presidential powers, Soeharto advanced his own position and that of his family. 
Political parties and interest groups were controlled and brought within a central 
corporatist framework of state-dominated political management. Golkar (golongan 
karya or functional group) was formed in 1967, as the government’s parliamentary 
arm and built upon the state-institutional membership of ABRI, KORPRI, and a 
variety of corporatist front groups, including the State Youth Association, KNPI and 
Veterans Association, Kosgoro. It was controlled by the Board of Patrons, with 
Soeharto as its chairman (Austin, 2001: p.118).   
Moreover, MacIntyre states that Indonesia’s political system was not only 
undemocratic, it also provided for an extraordinary centralization of decision-making 
authority in the presidency. No other institution or collection of political actors had 
the ability to veto the implementation of the president’s policy preferences or to 
initiate alternative policies (MacIntyre (in Pempel, 1999): p. 155). Similarly, Robison 
argues that the feature of the New Order regime has been the entrenchment and 
centralization of the authoritarian rule by military, the appropriation of the state by its 
officials, and the exclusion of political parties from effective participation in the 
decision making process (Robison, 1986: p. 105). Clearly, Indonesian political system 
under the New Order was authoritarian military based regime, which was 
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characterized by a central power on Soeharto’s hand. 
D. Conclusion 
Summing up, we can conclude that in the beginning of development process, 
two regimes were emphasizing on economic growth rather than wealth distribution. In 
order to pursue this goal, two regimes had a development plan, which was not only 
“market-friendly” but on the other hand was also controlled by the government. That 
is why; it was also so-called plan-rational development.   
Another valuable point of the two regimes is the significant role of 
technocrats in the development process. In designing, defining, formulating, and 
controlling development process government was supported by the technocrats. In 
two cases, we can find that the technocrats had university background and were 
trained abroad, usually in the U.S. Clearly, bureaucracy and technocrat had a very 
significant role in both cases.  
In two cases, we can find that big businesses were a central engine of 
economic growth. Big businesses grew due to government support, through favored 
policy, such as subsidy, protection, and special privilege. In this regard, two regimes 
were not only supporting, but also creating as well as controlling big businesses.  
Concerning the political structure, the two cases showed that both regimes 
regarded political stability and social discipline as an important pre-condition in order 
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to achieve their economic goals. Therefore, two regimes had faith in authoritarianism 
as the best mechanism to provide a favorable circumstance for economic development. 
Following MacIntyre argument, Korea and Indonesia can be seen as a military-based 
regime with a developmentalist orientation that have been characterized by a high 
level of state control over politics and policy (MacIntyre, 1990: p. 3). 
Obviously, state in the two cases has a central role in economic development. 
However, Indonesian economic development was not as successful as Korea’s was. 
Explaining the different performance forms the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter III 
The Role of the State on the Economic Development 
 
A. Introduction 
This chapter aims to analyze the effectiveness of the role of the state in 
Korean and Indonesian economic development process. The term that has been used 
by scholars to explain the role of government on economic development is 
developmental state. The term developmental state, initially and most forcefully, was 
articulated by Chalmers Johnson with specific reference to Japan (Pempel (in Woo-
Cumings, ed., 1999): p. 139).16 Johnson through his book, MITI and the Japanese 
Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy 1925 – 1975, gives the most powerful and 
persuasive explanation in analyzing Japanese economic growth by considering the 
role of the state. Some East Asian countries, then, adopted this model. 
In the developmental state model, economic development is the top priority 
for the government. In this sense, the strong political leadership commitment to 
economic development becomes the significant factor. In pursuing economic goals, 
government has a very significant role. Government is not only defining and 
generating national economic plan but also has a very significant role in implementing 
                                                          
16 Some scholars such as Alice Amsden, Eun Mee Kim, Robert Wade, Meredith Woo-Cumings also can 
be categorized advocating of this model as well. 
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the plan, including controlling the private sector. Economic development in 
developmental state can be seen as a plan-rational development, since it combines 
“market-friendly” approach with state guidance. Moreover, since the government has 
a very significant role, the rational and competent bureaucrats are very important to 
ensure the success of the state’s intervention in pursuing its national goal.  
Following the argument of developmental state model, this chapter, first, 
examines different levels of political leadership commitment to economic 
development goals. Then it elaborates the role of bureaucracy. This section presents 
the competent bureaucracy in Korean case versus the rent-seeking bureaucracy in 
Indonesian case. The last section examines the role of military in political economy of 
development. This part illustrates even though both countries were governed under 
the authoritarian-military regime; the military in Korean case only dealt with defense 
and security matters. While in Indonesian case, the military did not only have an 
enormous role in defense and security but also in business as well as politics. 
B. Political Leadership Commitment 
A military coup led by General Park Chung Hee in May 1961 can be seen as 
a starting point for the Korean economic development. After Park Chung Hee took 
power, the nation witnessed the emergence of a new political leadership fully 
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committed to economic development. The importance of having such leadership in 
place, to guide and nurture Korea’s economy through the early, critical stages of 
development cannot be underestimated. In fact, as SaKong points out, Adelman and 
Morris’ study suggests that leadership commitment is a critical factor or catalyst for 
economic development, particularly in countries such as Korea with favorable socio-
cultural standards (SaKong, 1993: p. 9). 
The strong leadership commitment to economic development can be found in 
Park Chung Hee’s earlier writing (Park Chung Hee, The Country, The Revolution, and 
I, (in Park Hun Joo): forthcoming): 
One must eat and breathe before concerning himself with politics, 
social affairs, and culture. Without a hope for an economic future, 
reforms in other fields could not be expected to yield fruit. At the risk 
of repetitiveness, I must again emphasize that without economic 
reconstruction, there would be no such things as triumph over 
communism or attaining independence. 
Park Chung Hee’s commitment to economic development can also be seen 
from the following quote (SaKong, 1993: p. 25): 
The focal point in politics in developing nations such as Korea is 
above all economic construction. As our old saying goes, no matter 
how wise one may be, he has to eat. Likewise, economic 
construction in developing nations, sufficient for people not to worry 
about food and clothing, is an absolutely basic requirement for 
democratic development (Remarks at a press conference, 1972). 
There are several reasons, why the new political leadership in Korean case 
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fully committed to economic development. First, it is related to the national 
unification and political progress. Park Chung Hee saw economic development as a 
means toward national unification and political progress (SaKong, 1993: p. 25). In 
this regard, he saw the economic development as a precondition for the national 
unification and democratization. Or in other words, without significant economic 
development, there would be no national unification and democratization. As it can be 
seen from Park Chung Hee’s speeches (SaKong, 1993: p. 25): 
Not only meaningful progress toward democracy but also promotion 
of national might to overcome communism and to unify the nation 
ultimately depend upon the success or failure of economic 
construction (August Fifteenth Liberation Day Address, 1964) 
Since the nation’s unification depends on the nation’s modernization 
and the modernization in turn depends on economic self-support, a 
self-supporting economy is the first step toward unification (New 
Year’s Presidential Message to the National Assembly, 1966). 
Second, it is related to the legitimacy of Park Chung Hee’s regime. Since 
Park Chung Hee took the power through a coup, he desperately needed legitimacy, 
both from inside and outside the country, particularly from the US government. To get 
legitimacy from the Korean people, Park Chung Hee needed to prove that the coup 
was necessary in order to bring the country to a better condition. Meanwhile, since 
Park Chung Hee was being suspected by the US government as a communist, Park 
Chung Hee had to prove the he was not a communist. Considering the condition 
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during the Cold War, this situation can be understood since the approval from the US 
government was very important for the political leadership in a country like Korea. 
Third, it is related to the security threat. The security threat, particularly from 
the communist regime in the North Korea was very important to the Korean 
development because it kept the military regime under Park Chung Hee focused on 
economic growth rather than on self-enrichment, as in so many other military regimes 
(Johnson (in Lee-Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim, eds., 1994): p. 77).  
Obviously, the political leadership commitment has a significant role for 
Korean economic development. Furthermore, the foundation of strong leadership 
commitment was instrumental in bringing about Korea’s government-led, or state-led, 
development strategy (SaKong, 1993: p. 27). The more important thing is that 
political commitment was quickly matched with concrete executive action, as Park 
Chung Hee proceeded methodologically to create the machinery needed to achieve his 
economic goals (Oh, 1999: p. 54). 
 One might argue that Soeharto regime in Indonesia was also committed to 
the economic development, since the central issue in the beginning of the New Order 
regime was how to achieve economic growth and political stability. However, this 
political leadership commitment seemed merely a political jargon rather than the real 
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one because it was not followed by the concrete executive action as found in the 
Korean case. 
The political economy structure of the New Order regime was characterized 
by the self-enrichment regime. Soeharto has succeeded to build a strong state with 
himself as a center of power. He successfully built an unchecked authority and 
eliminated political competition by controlling civil servants, bureaucrats, and civil 
society under the authoritarian military regime. This condition in turn allowed him to 
engineer streams of rents that were not only lucrative but also largely free of risk, and 
could then be used to enrich politically important allies and even family members 
(Temple, 2001: p. 22).  
Moreover, there was no constant, real, and perceived military threat from 
outside the country, as faced by Korea, which could force the regime to keep 
concentrating on economic development. As Temple argues that a key feature of 
Indonesia’s corruption problem: Soeharto’s grip on power was sufficiently secure that 
he had no incentive to compromise in his policies and interventions. In particular, 
there were few mechanisms by which the extent of corruption and self-enrichment 
regime could be restrained (Temple, 2001: p. 22).  
 
 C. Competent versus Rent-Seeking Bureaucracy  
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 The concept of the strong developmental state emphasizes the high degree of 
autonomy enjoyed by key decision-makers, especially in the bureaucracy (Booth: 
1998). Thus, according to Woo-Cumings another element of developmental state is 
responsible, capable, and clean bureaucracy (Woo-Cumings ed., 1999: p. 13). It 
means the existence of bureaucracy was supporting the industrialization process. This 
kind of professional and meritocratic bureaucracy relatively can be found in East 
Asian countries and not in other developmental state.  
Bureaucratic capacity building in Indonesia has proceeded along two 
tracks—the strengthening of central agencies and the strengthening of the center’s 
hold on regional and local government. Soeharto inherited a weak and demoralized 
civil service in 1966, which was further, gutted in order to root out leftist elements. 
The regime moved to ensure loyalty with the establishment of a single national Corps 
of Civil Servants (Korps Pegawai Negeri, Korpri).17 Business firms, professionals, 
industrial workers, peasants, and other societal audiences have been tidily collated 
into functional groups, namely GOLKAR (Golongan Karya, Functional Group) as a 
machinery politics of the New Order regime to maintain its power (Case (in Chan, 
Clark, Lam, eds.,1998): p. 146). 
                                                          
17 Barber, “The Case Study of Indonesia”, in 
http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/state/indon/indonsum.htm 
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Clearly, the bureaucracy and administrative apparatus in Indonesia was 
influenced by political structure. Bureaucracy was a political tool for the authoritarian 
regime instead of becoming an independent actor. Along with military, bureaucracy 
became a central political control to ensure the political stability and social discipline 
(Mas’oed, 1994: p. 37). This condition, in turn resulted in a weak and corrupted 
bureaucracy, which became a barrier for economic development process. 
A weak and corrupted bureaucracy was not the characteristics of Korean 
bureaucracy. Leon points out the Korean state apparatus is close to the ideal type of a 
rational Weberian bureaucracy.18 Moreover, it features Schumpeterian characteristics 
such as the provision of the requirements for improving the innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and international competitiveness of private agents 19  since its 
recruitment system was based on a high competitive examination. The April 1963 
National Civil Service Law based bureaucratic positions upon competitive 
examinations, performance evaluations, and guaranteed job security. As for 
recruitment, based partly on the Japanese elite’s university-recruitment system. This, 
in turn, has attracted many well-qualified and ambitious individuals to government 
service (Austin, 2001: p. 133).  
                                                          
18 The ideal type of rational Weberian bureaucracy refers to the role of a rational, efficient, well-
organized bureaucracy as a sine qua non condition for economic development (Leon, Jose Luis 
“Culture, the State, and Economic Development in Korea and Mexico”, in 
http://orpheous.ucsd.edu/ias/studies/pdf3/leon.pdf 
19 Leon, Jose Luis, ibid. 
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In a similar way, Simonia writes the major aspects of the bureaucracy in 
Korea are as follows: 20  first, professionalism and acumen in economic matters. 
Second, it has no ideological biases in the narrow sense of party affiliations but is 
oriented and even faithful to the national cause and economic reforms (“socially-
oriented bureaucracy”). Third, it is independent materially, for the most part, of 
business. The relations between the bureaucracy and business are those of leader and 
subordinate. In this context, there were no close personal contacts between the 
bureaucrats and business. Fourth, business did not take part in politics or serve as a 
springboard for promotion to government posts. Fifth, the level of corruption of the 
state bureaucracy is relatively low. 
Nevertheless, one might argue that Korea was also facing corruption and 
collusion problems. 21  However, these problems did not hinder the process of 
economic development. As Ha-Won Jang 22  argues, the point is not whether the 
government was relatively clean or not, but why corruption did not impede economic 
growth. Furthermore, he points out that from the economic point of view, corruption 
is not an ethical issue but a question of whether or not it disrupts capital accumulation. 
                                                          
20 Simonia, Nodari, op.cit, in http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/sympo/Proceed97/Simonia1.html 
21 Based on Global Corruption Report 2000 published by Transparency Internationa1, Korea is on the 
rank 42 out of 88, with the range 3.4 – 5.6 (for the ranges between 10: highly clean and 0: highly 
corrupt). While Indonesia is on the last rank along with Uganda with the range 0.2 – 3.1 
http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/download/data_and_research.pdf  
22 Ha-Won Jang, “Korean Economic Development and Industrial Policy”, paper presented on 
International Program on Korea’s Economic Development and Policy Assignment in Transition 
Economies, held by Center for Knowledge Partnership, KDI School, September 16-24, 2001, p. 23. 
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Often corruption is assumed to be wasteful, but it is only true when resources spent on 
corruption are not re-invested into production. In Korean case, corruption did happen 
but it was not wasteful, rather it re-invested into a production activity. That is why; it 
did not hinder economic growth. 
Moreover following Amsden’s argument23, Jang points out that in Korea, 
state created a constant stream of new and often bigger rents in the next round of 
competition geared towards industrial upgrading. And since the state was always 
willing to withdraw support to non-performers including chaebol, this transitory 
character of rents forced the firms to enhance their technological capability.24 
Another obvious contrast between Korean and Indonesian case related to 
corruption problem is the effort of the government to eliminate the corruption 
problem itself. Similar to Indonesia, corruption can be seen as a cultural problem for 
Korea.25 However, Korea has a long lasting history of corruption prevention, even 
since the Kingdom period. It can be traced from the existence of the Board of Audit 
and Inspection (BAI) which was basically a manifestation of Sajongbu from Shilla 
dynasty26 in modern time. This board responsible for auditing states’ budget and 
                                                          
23 As Amsden argued an insulated economic bureaucracy in Korea has been permitted to set strict 
performance criteria, and to discipline private sector firms who did not measure up. This in turn 
permitted the implementation of government policies designed to establish and strengthen non-existent 
or weak markets, or to overcome coordination failures (Amsden as quoted by Stiglitz in Anne Booth, 
1998). 
24 Ha-Won Jang, op.cit, p. 23-24. 
25 There is a tradition in Korea to give “chonji” or present to express one’s thankfulness. This tradition, 
in turn, can be seen as a source of bribery or corruption. 
26 Sajongbu was an auditing and inspection board that established in 659 (Kompas, October 8, 2002).     
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monitoring the performance of civil servant and public institution.   
Actually, Indonesia also has a similar board. However, the board of audit and 
inspection in Indonesia can not execute their roles effectively, since there is no law 
enforcement. This is different with what we can found in Korea. For example, in 
Korea, the former presidents and even the son of the current president was jailed 
because of corruption problem. On the contrary, many of high rank officers in 
Indonesia, even though they were proven to be corrupt, it was difficult to bring them 
to the court. Clearly, even though Korea faces the same corruption problem as that of 
Indonesia, Korea has better aspect on law enforcement and corruption prevention.     
In sum, the role of bureaucracy becomes a striking contrast between Korean 
and Indonesian case. Indonesia did not have a rational and competent bureaucracy as 
Korea had, rather it had a rent-seeking bureaucracy. In his study on the relationship 
between state and development, Budiman classifies Korea as a “developmental 
authoritarian bureaucratic state” 27 , while he calls Indonesia as a “rent-seeking 
authoritarian bureaucratic state” (Budiman, 1991). It is because the authoritarian 
bureaucratic state in Korea was used to foster the economic growth, and on the other 
hand, in Indonesian case, the authoritarian bureaucratic state was preoccupied with 
rent-seeking activities for self-enrichment. 
                                                          
27 Similarly, Cumings (1984) claims a term, the ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian industrializing regime 
(BAIR)’, to describe the political foundation for capitalist development in Korea (Chung in Moon and 
Yong Cheol Kim (in Leftwich ed., 1996): p. 142). 
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D. The Role of Military 
 
The Indonesian political structure was characterized by the important role of 
bureaucracy and military as a political control to ensure the political stability and 
social discipline. It can be seen from the involvement of Indonesian Armed Forces 
(Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia,ABRI) into key bureaucratic positions. The 
bureaucracy grew rapidly, from perhaps 600,000 in 1965 to 1.6 million in 1974 to 
over 3 million in 1986. By the late 1970s, military appointees held half the cabinet 
positions, over two-thirds of the governorships, and 56 percent of district-head 
positions. Within bureaucracy, 78 percent of director generals and 84 percent of 
ministerial secretaries were military appointees.28 By the late 1980s, the practice of 
appointment of military personnel to civil office was highly institutionalized. The 
average rank of officers assigned to senior civil service posts rose (Bresnan, 1993: p. 
110). 
Moreover, the domination of military role in the development was also 
reflected in the military structure, which was in parallel with the structure of civilian 
bureaucracy. The military organization, as well as the civilian bureaucracy has a 
command line from the province level until the village level. This kind of structure 
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was designed to make military control over the decision-making policy in every level 
of bureaucracy become more effective. 
Another important thing is that the military has also been involved in 
economic sector. The military has been involved in economic activities since the early 
1950s. At its earliest level, these economic activities took the form of illegal levies on 
businessmen, the imposition of various tolls on the transport of goods, and including 
smuggling, providing protection, and forging papers for the operations. The most 
significant movement of the military into economic activity took place in 1958/59 
when they secured control of the bulk of the nationalized Dutch enterprises. After 
1965, the military continued to develop its economic power, and the military 
commands began to formalize their private business activities by establishing 
military-owned companies (Robison, 1986: p. 250 – 251). 
Up until now, the involvement of military, either as an individual military 
man or as an institution still persists. The retirement of armed service personnel, 
particularly the most seniors among them was also facilitated by widespread use of 
government connections to obtain licenses, contracts, bank loans, and import credits 
for private firms established by individual officers, often in partnership with local 
Chinese businessmen (Bresnan, 1993: 107).  
The reason behind those economic activities was primarily to raise extra-
                                                                                                                                                                      
28 Barber, Ibid. 
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budgetary revenue for the operations of individual commands and units as well as for 
the personal and political needs of individual officers and political factions (Robison, 
1986: p. 251). According to Susanto and Supriatma, military owns around more than 
50 companies, including corporations, cooperatives, and foundations (see Appendix 
A). The area of military business is diverse, including insurance, air transportation, 
timber, finance, etc (Susanto and Supriatma, 1995). 
All non-military activities were taken by Indonesian military due to its claim 
that they had a “dual function” (Dwifungsi): to defend the nation against enemies 
from within and without, by force of arms if necessary, and to assure wise and 
effective public policies. As Bresnan points out, Indonesia’s army claimed a role in 
the management of public affairs since it based their argument on its role in achieving 
national independence. It is because the Indonesian army of 1966 was not the creation 
of a former colonial power, it was not an army led by men trained to serve as 
apolitical officers, as was the case in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore. The 
Indonesian army was the creation of revolution; it was led by men who had joined to 
fight for national independence and stayed on to fight for national unity, as in Burma 
and Vietnam (Bresnan, 1993: p. 273).  
As a result of the implementation of “dual function”, there was a massive 
infusion of military men into civil posts occurred at every level from the presidency to 
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the villages from 1966 onwards. As late as 1986 the armed forced held 40 percent of 
top positions in the entire central bureaucracy and this figure did not include the state 
economy enterprises where they were believed to be almost universally in charge.29 
The enormous role of military in both political and economy did not occur in 
the Korean case, even though for more than thirty-two years from 1961 – 1993, Korea 
was ruled by military dominated governments. From May 1961 to December 1963 the 
military directly ruled the country through a military junta that was called the 
Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), which was headed by Major 
General Park Chung Hee (Oh, 1993: p. 48).  
Furthermore, power in Korea was highly concentrated in the central state, 
symbolized by the presidential Blue House. President Park Chung Hee’s 
modernization strategy in the early 1960s instituted this militarized system of strictly 
hierarchical decision-making, where the body politic was relegated to uniformly 
carrying out decisions made at the top (Hun Joo Park: forthcoming).  
The authoritarian military regime then was strengthened by the 
implementation of the Yushin Honpop (Revitalizing Constitution), which was aimed at 
ensuring political stability and at completing the historic task of national revival 
through socio-economic progress under strong presidential leadership.30 The Yushin 
                                                          
29 Bresnan, John. Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy in 
http://www.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/book/bresnan/epilog.html   
30 A Handbook of Korea, Korean Overseas Information Services, 9th edition, Seoul: 1993. p. 271. 
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rule was regarded as the second “bloodless” coup executed by Park Chung Hee (Oh, 
1999: p. 60).  
Nevertheless, military only controlled the political stability and social 
discipline and did not involve in economy or business, or in the key bureaucratic 
position as appeared in Indonesian case. Contrary to Indonesian case, in Korea there 
is a restriction for the soldiers to have a career other than military job. This restriction 
appears on Soldiers’ Service Regulations dated on March 15, 1966 by the order 
number 2465 of president of Republic Korea. This regulation is revised several times 
by the order of president since it was established. Those are order no. 4923 (April 4, 
1970), 7040 (January 4, 1974), 8262 (October 13, 1976), 13240 (January 5, 1991), 
14393 (September 30, 1994), 14951 (March 16, 1996), 15954 (December 31, 1998). 
The regulation states that:31 
“Soldiers, service regulations Chapter 3 (service), paragraph 1 
(service bearing), sentence 16 (prohibiting the work for a profit 
and the dual-position). Soldier should not work at the position 
for a profit or another job except military affairs. But, if the 
Secretary of Ministry of National Defense accepts and allows 
that the work is not related to political, anti-society, or profit and 
does not affect to the performance of military service, then it can 
be an exception.” 
 
E. Conclusion 
 
                                                          
31 From various sources 
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Based on the previous explanation I conclude that Korea consistently follows 
the expectation of developmental state argument. In this regard, Korea can be 
categorized as a relatively successful case of state’s role in the political economy of 
development.  
The effectiveness of state’s intervention in Korea was determined by several 
conditions; first, it relates with the strong political leadership commitment in pursuing 
economic development goals. It is also supported by the existence of the relatively 
clean, rational, and competent bureaucracy, along with professional military. The 
meritocratic bureaucracy is an important condition for the successful government 
intervention in Korean economic development, since it relates to the ability of the 
government to overcome the negative excess of its own intervention policy. In this 
regard, following Amsden’s argument, how Korean government dealt with the 
corruption and collusion problem, which in turn made them able to concentrate on the 
economic growth is a very important factor for the success of its economic 
development. 
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Chapter IV 
The Colonial Legacy and Geo-politics  
A. Introduction 
 
This chapter examines historical and international systemic situation, which 
might contributed to economic development. Specifically, it elaborates the influence 
of colonial legacies and geo-political situation to the economic development process. 
This chapter argues that in spite of the harsh experience during the Japanese colonial 
rule, the Japanese colonial legacy in Korea contributed for providing positive initial 
condition for economic development in the post-colonial period. While in Indonesian 
case, instead of providing positive contribution for economic development, Dutch 
colonial legacy inherited “the ethnic division of labor”. It resulted in the ethnic 
disparities of wealth and income as well as rent-seeking activity, which eventually 
hindered the effectiveness of state’s role in economic development in the post-
colonial period.  
Another important circumstance is the geo-political situation, which was 
based on the international systemic explanation. By international systemic explanation 
being used here refers to the geo-political situation and the real security threat, which 
was rooted from international politics situation that might positively contribute to 
development. Following Wade’s word, Korea was blessed by geopolitics. Korea is on 
the fault line of post-Second World War global politics, abutting Communist Asia 
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(Wade, 1992: p. 312). Meanwhile, Indonesia’s position is not as important as Korea’s 
is. Surrounded by almost all non-communist countries and located in a relatively 
peaceful region made Indonesia not become a political and security priority of U.S 
foreign policy, which also gave a significant contribution for Korean economic 
development. 
 
B. The Colonial Legacy   
Korea started its economic development in the early 1960s after Park Chung 
Hee seized the power. However, to fully understand Korean political economy of 
development, we should examine the initial condition of development before Park 
Chung Hee took power.  
One might argue that Korean economic development can be traced even from 
the period before Japanese colonization, that is, Three Kingdom period (Koguryo, 
Silla, and Paekche). However, compared to the previous period, the Japanese 
colonization provided a condition for the significant modern transformation of the 
Korean economic development.30  
                                                          
30 The writer realizes that there is a huge dispute among scholars concerning whether the Japanese 
colonial rule contributed or not for the Korean economic development. It is an undeniable fact that the 
Japanese colonization was a dark suppressing period in Korea modern history. And as a result, it still 
becomes traumatic experience for almost all of Korean people. One reason of disagreement on 
contribution of Japanese colonial rule for Korean economic development is that after Korean War 
occurred in 1950-1953 and Korea divided into two part—South and North—most of the heavy industry 
and electricity, such as iron and steel, hydroelectric power, coal industry, and chemical industry, which 
    40
It has been argued that Japanese colonization has ultimately laid the 
foundations for a modern transformation of the Korean economy (Eckert et.al, 1990: p. 
390). As SaKong points out Korea was almost entirely an agrarian economy before 
the Japanese colonization of 1919. During the colonial era of 1910 to 1945, the 
Korean economy experienced rapid structural transformation. The structural pattern of 
this development was largely determined by the Japanese colonial regime (SaKong, 
1993: p.1). In addition, Japanese colonization also introduced a scientific approach to 
agriculture and invested heavily in infrastructure. As Koo argued, even though it was 
not a significant industrialization, it is generally believed that Japanese colonization 
left substantial foundation of infrastructure on which later industrialization could 
build (Koo, 1987: p.167).  
 
Table 4.1 Selected Indexes of Production in Korea (1910 – 1937)  
 
 Aggregate Measures Agriculture Mining Manufacturing 
Period GDPb Commodity 
Productc 
Value 
added 
Productiond Value 
added 
Production Value added Production 
1910-14 48.121 67.07 75.90 73.68 54.76 26.862 18.66 31.252 
1915-19 60.25 83.27 91.88 87.72 91.67 61.35 42.63 66.71 
1920-24 96.07 90.93 97.51 96.49 55.95 76.24 55.65 70.91 
1925-29 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1930-34 100.99 122.91 117.42 113.16 203.57 160.52 123.97 126.36 
1935-39 122.463 142.49 113.79 127.19 572.62 467.284 244.34 269.19 
         
Annual Compound Rates of Growtha 
1912-27 5.32 2.70 1.85 2.06 4.11 7.465 11.84 5.695 
1927-37 2.39 3.60 1.30 2.43 19.07 18.706 9.34 10.41 
1912-37 4.15 3.06 1.63 2.21 9.84 11.827 10.83 7.813 
                                                                                                                                                                      
were established by Japanese become the part of North Korea. Meanwhile, most of South Korean 
region was still primarily agriculture (Chowdhury and Islam 1993, Oh 1999, SaKong 1993). For the 
further discussion on the contribution of Japanese colonization on Korean economic development, see 
Eckert (et.al) 1990, Koo (1987), Lowe (1997), SaKong (1993). However, for disagreement on 
prevailing opinion, which is seeing that modern economic growth in former Japanese colonies owes 
much to the era of Japanese imperialism, can be found on the argument of Chowdhury and Islam 
(1993) and Hun Joo Park (forthcoming), particularly chapter four, section two. 
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11911-14  21914  31935-38  41935-36  51915-27  61927-35  71915-37 
a Based on 5-year averages centered around the initial and terminal years of each period. When 5-year 
averages are not available, 3-year averages are used. 
b Gross Domestic Product in 1934-36 average prices estimated by the expenditure approach. 
c Sum of value added in 1936 prices originating from agriculture, fishery, forestry, mining, and 
manufacturing. 
d This is an output index of rice, barley, beans, other grains, and cotton. 
Source: Pao-san Ho, Samuel. “Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung, “ in 
Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895 – 1945, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1984 (Table 1). 
 
Similarly, Lowe argues that Japanese economy policy in Korea (during 
colonialism period) was governed by the motive of strengthening the economic and 
strategic situation of Japan. However, the important thing is that the basis for the 
subsequent development in the Korean economy had been laid (Lowe, 1997: p. 6). 
Furthermore, since Japanese looked at its colonies as a supporting enclave of its 
development, Samuel Pao-San Ho (Pao-San Ho (in Myers and Peattie, eds.), 1984: 
347-348) states that, it was inevitable for Japan to develop its colonies. Japan 
implemented economic development policies during its colonization period, such as 
building economic infrastructure, improving health and education system, providing 
essential service and production, and reforming government financial program. 
One could argue that these physical facilities and other infrastructures such 
as railways system were destroyed during the Korean War. Nevertheless, as Dower 
points out, what matters is not the physical goods destroyed, but the skill of the 
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population and the resources available to them (Dower: 1993). 
 
Table 4.2. Growth and Composition of Manufacturing in Korea (1913 – 1940)  
 
Period Total Food Textile Wood 
and 
Wood 
Products
Chemicals Non-
Metallic 
Mineral 
Production
Metals Machinery Others 
Production Growth Ratesa 
1913-27 5.99 6.68 5.92 14.23 7.82 15.15 5.08 6.49 1.18 
1927-39 10.29 7.87 10.04 1.95 17.38 10.79 8.66 10.49 2.40 
1913-39 8.12 7.27 7.96 7.91 12.50 12.95 6.85 8.47 1.79 
          
Production Compotitionb 
1914-16 100% 35 13 1 12 3 16 2 18 
1926-28 100% 43 14 3 16 3 7 3 10 
1936-40 100% 27 18 2 30 3 11 3 6 
 
a Annual compound rates of growth of real output based on 3-year averages centered around the initial and 
terminating years of each period. 
b The average percentage distribution of gross output in current value 
Source: Pao-san Ho, Samuel. “Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung, “ in 
Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895 – 1945, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1984 (Table 2). 
 
In a similar way, according to Dutt and Kim, the colonial rule was harsh, but 
nonetheless contributed to the building of a basic physical infrastructure, laying down 
the basis for industrial development. More significantly, it provided a model of highly 
articulate, discipline colonial bureaucracy, later to be adopted by Koreans for state-
directed development (Dutt, Kim, Singh (eds.), 1994: p. 174). 
The contribution of Japanese colonial rule is not only confined to physical 
facilities or tangible factors. It can also be seen from intangible factors, such as human 
capital. In this context, President Park Chung Hee is a clear example. Park Chung Hee, 
the most important factor behind Korean economic development, was an elite product 
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of the Japanese colonial military system. Park Chung Hee was fluent in Japanese and 
deeply influenced both intellectually and emotionally by his training during Japan’s 
period of Asian military industry supremacy (Eckert, et.al 1990: p. 392).  
The Japanese colonial legacy also contributed to the introduction of universal 
primary education (Booth: 1998). 31  There was, however, discrimination toward 
Korean children compared to children from Japanese families. By 1945 almost 45 
percent of Korean youth were enrolled in primary school. After 1945 both primary 
and secondary enrollments grew rapidly (Booth: 1998). Following liberation in 1945, 
education continued to expand. In 1960, Korea had the highest literacy rates for 
primary and secondary enrollment ratios.  
 
Table 4.3. Estimated Percent of Total Population Enrolled in School (1830 – 
1954)  
 
Percent of Population in School Country 
1830 1850 1878 1887 1928 1954 
England and Wales 9 12 15 16 16 15 
Germany 17 16 17 18 17 13 
United States 15 28 19 22 24 22 
Argentina    7 14 16 
Mexico    5 9 12 
Brazil    3 - 9 
Japan    7 13 23 
Korea    - 4a 17 
India    2 4 7 
 
aIncludes North Korea and date is 1938  
Source: Amsden, Alice H., Asia’s Next Giant South Korea and Late Industrialization. New 
                                                          
31 When the Japanese established control over the Korean peninsular in the first decade of this century 
there had already been a proliferation of “modern” schools, some of them established by Christian 
missionaries. In the beginning 1919, the Japanese colonial authorities set about eliminating all private 
(including Christian) schools and introducing universal primary education in Japanese (Tsurumi (1984) 
    44
York: Oxford University Press, p. 217. 
  
Based on the previous explanation, Japanese colonization can be seen as a 
source for the fundamental structure of Korean economic development. However, the 
positive contribution of colonial legacy could not be found in the Indonesian case. 
The Indonesian economy under Dutch colonial rule was characterized by trade 
activities rather than an industrialization process, a contrast to Korean case. 
Furthermore, Indonesia inherited the “ethnic division of labor” while such a feature 
did not appear in Korea.  
According to Budiman, Dutch colonization was characterized by the raw 
material export activity from Indonesia to the Netherlands as a state-mother (Budiman, 
1991: p.23). Indonesia as a colony was put only as a raw material supplier to support 
the process of industrialization in the mother-state. However, the industrialization 
itself did not occur in Indonesia. That is why; during the Dutch colonization, the 
Indonesian economy system was more likely characterized by trade activities rather 
than an industrialization process. 
Nevertheless, the trade activities during this period did not generate a native 
entrepreneur class. This was due to the ethnic division of labor, which was introduced 
by the colonial government. According to this policy, the Dutch colonial government 
divided the society into three classes. The first class was Dutch, including the other 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and McGinn et.al. (1980) in Booth: 1998).  
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European countries, the second was Chinese people and other Asian people such as 
Arabian, and the last class was the indigenous people called “pribumi”.  
This differentiation had a huge impact for almost all aspects of life; such as 
the access to education, political sector, and the most important thing was the access 
to economic sector. It did not only resulted in the ethnic disparities in income and 
wealth, but at the same time this policy also contributed to the emergence of the 
business class from the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. This policy in turn is giving 
specific characteristic on the role of conglomerates in Indonesian economic 
development, which differs from the Korean case. As we can found in the Korean 
case, the rise of conglomerates in Indonesia is the fruits of government policy and 
strategy, which are intended to create strong national companies by providing 
facilities and support to them.32  However, history recorded, the fate of company 
groups or conglomerates in Indonesia was largely determined by political factor, and 
economic condition, which was rooted in an ethnic division of labor during the 
colonization period.  
The ethnic division of labor still remains after Indonesia got its independence, 
even though there were some several modifications on it, particularly in the political 
sector. The post-colonial government diminished the access of Chinese people into 
political sector. However, on the other hand, in the economic sector government still 
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gave the large opportunity for Chinese people as Dutch colonial rule did, since 
government needs the support from big business in order to develop the country—
particularly during the Soeharto era.  
Moreover, Chinese entrepreneurs are smart and skillful enough to benefit 
from various government supports. Many of them become big and emerged as strong 
and powerful conglomerates such as Salim Group and Sinar Mas Group, the two most 
prominent conglomerates in Indonesia. The government has tried to create strong 
indigenous entrepreneurs by providing special privileges to them, but so far it has 
never reached the target. Until now, the indigenous entrepreneurs are still lagging far 
behind33 (see Appendix B).  
There are indeed some big conglomerates owned by indigenous 
entrepreneurs such as Bimantara Group and Citra Agratama Persada Group, but they 
are owned by former Presidents Soeharto’s children, who are now being investigated 
and accused of their involvement in corruption, collusion, and nepotistic (CCN) 
practice. It should be noted that there are quite a number of conglomerates owned by 
indigenous entrepreneurs, but they are connected with the elite power group and 
enjoying special privileges in the CCN category.  
The CCN conglomerates include also those owned by Soeharto’s cronies, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
32 “Anatomy of Indonesian Conglomerates” in http://www.datacon.co.id/conglo.htm 
33 “Anatomy of Indonesian Conglomerates” in ibid. 
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such as Salim or Liem Sioe Liong, Bob Hasan or The Kiang Seng, and Prayogo 
Pangestu or Phang Djun Phoen. 34  As Woo-Cumings points out, Indonesia is an 
example of a classic case of sultan-like dictatorship and political-monopoly sort of 
capitalism in one family, with Soeharto and his relatives and children constituting by 
far the biggest conglomerates with the truly element, the ethnic Chinese business class 
(Woo-Cumings, ed.,1999: p. 19). 
In sum, there was a big difference between two countries concerning the 
colonial legacy, which has significant impact to the further economic development in 
the postcolonial period. Japanese colonial rule in Korea contributed to the promotion 
of industrialization process in Korea, since Korea was regarded as a supporting 
enclave of its development. Meanwhile, the industrialization did not occur in 
Indonesia under Dutch colonization. Indonesia was regarded only as a raw material 
supplier to support the process of industrialization in the mother-state. Unlike the 
Korean economy, which can be characterized as an industrialization promotion, the 
Indonesian economy under Dutch colonization was characterized as a trade promotion. 
In sum, we can argue that compared to Indonesia, Korea has started its 
industrialization process earlier. 
Besides that, the colonization period in Indonesia was also producing an 
“ethnic division of labor”, which contributed to the domination of Indonesian 
                                                          
34 “Anatomy of Indonesian Conglomerates” in ibid. 
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economy by the Chinese minorities.35 Due to the “ethnic division of labor”, Indonesia 
in the post-colonial era has had to face two disturbing problems; ethnic disparities in 
income and wealth and rent-seeking activity.  
In order to overcome the problem caused by the Chinese domination of the 
economy, the Indonesian government then tried hard to promote “the indigenous 
entrepreneur class”. However, in reality this kind of policy resulted in a kind of rent-
seeking activity. To create indigenous entrepreneur class, government provided a 
special privilege, but limited only to those who had a close relationship with the elite 
power group.  
In this context, “the ethnic division of labor” contributed to the characteristic 
of the relationship between government and big business in Indonesia. Unlike the 
Korean case, which was showing that the subsidy, protection, and privilege became an 
incentive for the business group to build its business and fostered economic growth, in 
the Indonesian case it impeded it. Subsidy allocations in the Indonesian case (and 
other South-East Asian countries as well) have seldom been tied to any credible 
performance criteria, but are usually made either on the basis of political cronyism, or 
to achieve non-economic goals such as the promotion of indigenous business.  
                                                          
35 According to Bresnan, of a total Indonesian population of 147 million in 1981, 4.1 million or 2.8 
percent were estimated to be ethnic Chinese. Some Chinese families had been in Indonesia for 
generation and had prospered under Dutch rule. Others had arrived after World War II and some 1.0 
million were still not Indonesian citizens as late as 1970s. It was even said that some Chinese 
businessmen had settled their families abroad so as to make it easy to leave themselves should that 
become necessary (Bresnan, 1993: p. 152 – 154). 
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Yoshihara points out that the indigenous capitalists have emerged, but they 
are often mere “rent-seekers”, exploiting political connections to build up huge 
conglomerates 36 . Therefore, government intervention and its relations with big 
business in the Indonesian case has tended to be less growth promoting and more 
oriented to goals such as inter-ethnic redistribution of wealth (Booth: 1998), which 
resulted in rent-seeking activity. 
 
C. International Politics and Geopolitics  
 
The end of the World War II and the dawning of the Cold War brought a 
significant change in international relations arena. After the liberation, Korea was 
divided into two parts, North and South. The United States military forces occupied 
South Korea until 1948 when the government of the Republic of Korea was 
established (SaKong, 1993: p. 2). Korea geographically is very important for the 
United States’ political goal in order to prevent the expansion of communism in the 
Cold War. The United States strongly supported the Korean government, politically 
and economically.  
South Korea, as well as Taiwan, received enormous amount of United States 
                                                          
36 Yoshihara categorizes the South East Asian capitalism as a “Crony capitalism and Ersatz capitalism”, 
and by implication, unsustainable (Booth: 1998). 
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aid and military assistance. The average annual inflow of aid to Korea from 1953 
through 1958 was $270 million. The strong support from the United States enabled 
the Korean government not only to maintain basic economic and social order but also 
make substantial investments in infrastructure development, especially in education 
(Koo 1987: p.168). As Byung-Kook Kim writes: 
“The Republic was, in a word, a product of US foreign policy. The 
Americans provided a nuclear umbrella, orchestrated a massive influx of 
international economic aid…The US was a lifeline for Korea, supplying 
the military, economic, and scientific resources needed for state formation 
and nation building (Byung-Kook Kim in Diamond and Plattner (eds.), 
1998: p. 120). 
 
Until the early 1960s, Korea was one of the largest benefactors of 
international aid, due to her strategic importance at the center of the international Cold 
War. During the 1950s, over 60% of imports were supplied by foreign aid, reaching a 
peak at 85% in 1957.37 
 Woo-Cumings highlights the magnitude of this aid inflow in the following 
manner: 
“From 1946 to 1976, the United States provided $ 12.6 billion in American 
economic and military aid to Korea …No other country in the world 
received such large sums…with the exception of Israel and South Vietnam. 
The Korean total of $ 6 billion in United States economic grants and loans, 
1946-1978, compares to $ 6.89 for all Africa, and $ 14.89 billion for all 
Latin America. United States military deliveries to Taiwan and Korea in 
1955 – 78 …totalled $ 9.05 billion, whereas Latin America combined 
received $ 3.2 billion” (Woo-Cumings 1991 in Chowdhury and Islam 1993: 
                                                          
37 Ha-Won Jang, op.cit. 
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p.35).  
  
Also worth noting is that nearly all of the American aid to Korea before 1964 
was provided on a grant basis, thus making it possible for the country to begin its 
export-led growth in 1960s without a backlog of debt (Eckert et.al 1990: p. 396). 
Furthermore Eckert argues that American aid was clearly crucial factor in Korea’s 
postcolonial economic survival, particularly between 1945 - 1950 and in the country’s 
postwar reconstruction after 1953. Indeed, between 1953 and 1962 American aid 
financed about 70% of Korea’s imports and accounted for nearly 80% of total fixed 
capital formation, mainly in the areas of transportation, manufacturing, and electric 
power (Eckert et.al 1990: p. 396). 
As a result of the American occupation at the end of the World War II and the 
beginning of Cold War was the decreasing role of the landlord class after the 
implementation of land reform. In this regard, the success of the American military 
government was to push for a land reform, which had a profound impact on the class 
structure of Korea (Koo 1987: p.167). 
 In fact, aid and military assistance were not the only ways the United States 
assisted Korean economic development. The United States also gave assistance 
through loan, foreign direct investment, technology transfer, and access to the U.S. 
market. All of these provided substantial contributions for the foundation of Korean 
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economic development in the future (SaKong 1993: p. 96 – 130). 
 Concerning technology transfer, Eckert (et.al) states that the influx of 
American capital into Korea has been accompanied by a corresponding flow of 
American technology and technical expertise. Aid has helped finance technology 
transfers from American firms and the creation of official research and development 
organizations like the Korea Development Institute (KDI) and the Korea Institute of 
Science and Technology (KIST). The U.S. itself has, since 1945, been the primary 
training ground for South Korean economic and industrial technocrats, many of whom 
have been supported by aid funds (Eckert et.al 1990: p. 396-7).  
Meanwhile, Eckert (et.al) argues that the special U.S. – South Korea 
relationship also gave South Korea privileged access to U.S. markets. Until the early 
1990s, the U.S. more or less accepted South Korean protectionist policies as a 
necessary part of the growth process and allowed many South Korean export duty-
free statuses under the General System of Preferences (GSP), a program instituted in 
1976 to promote trade with developing countries (Eckert et.al 1990: p. 397).  
Similarly, Wade points out, since Korea and Taiwan had an important role in 
term of geopolitics view for the U.S., they therefore took on unusually great 
importance. This reinforced the U.S. concern for their economic growth (more than 
for Latin America’s), a concern that translated into massive aid, good access to the 
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biggest, richest market in the world, and the U.S. tolerance of their import barriers and 
state support for the U.S. companies wishing to invest there (Wade 1992: p. 312). 
Obviously, due to its geopolitical situation, Korea received enormous amount 
of United States’ aid and military assistance. This condition did not appear in 
Indonesian case, since its geopolitical position is not as important as that of Korea’s. 
Thus, these advantages, which were gained by Korea, could not be found in 
Indonesian case.  
D. Conclusion 
Korea has historical and geo-political advantages compared to Indonesia. 
The Japanese colonial legacy in Korea contributed to the foundations for Korea’s 
modern transformation of the economy. The international politics and geo-political 
situation, which resulted in the U.S. assistance, positively contributed to Korean 
economic development. This was true particularly in the early stage of its economic 
development. 
The writer admits that these issues are very sensitive and controversial. It is 
an undeniable fact that Japanese colonization was a dark suppressing period in Korean 
modern history. Similarly, relating to the U.S. assistance, some might argue that the 
amount of aid did not contribute anything if the recipient did not have the ability to 
manage and utilize it in the proper way. 
    54
Despite its being controversial, this chapter proposes to provide another 
important variable that should be taken into account in examining the success of 
Korean economic development. 
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Chapter V 
Conclusion 
 
 The state in Korea and Indonesia played a critical role in economic 
development. It reflected on the choice of strategy and development plan, the role of 
technocrats, and the relationship between government and the big businesses. In two 
cases, economic development became the top priority for the government. In 
particular, both governments were placing “growth-first” rather than “equity-first” 
strategy as their priority. In pursuing these goals, political stability and social 
discipline became an important pre-condition. Therefore, two countries had faith in 
authoritarianism as the best mechanism to provide a favorable circumstance for 
economic development.  
The governments in two cases have a very important role in defining, 
generating, and implementing the economic development plan. In this process, 
government was supported by the technocrats. Besides, government also had a power 
in controlling the private sector. Clearly, in two cases, state has a very significant role 
in economic development. However, the result is different. Indonesia’s economic 
development was not as successful as that of Korea’s. Even though both states were at 
the center of economic development process, why did the two states produce different 
results?  
This thesis has compared divergent political economy of development 
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between Korea and Indonesia. In explaining this divergent, the historical-structuralists 
is used. The historical-structuralists identify macro-historical forces (such as state and 
social formation, colonial legacies, and geo-politics) and their conjunctural dynamics 
to the political economy of development.  
The findings indicate that; first, in spite of the harsh experience during the 
Japanese colonial rule, the Japanese colonial legacy in Korea contributed for 
providing positive initial condition for economic development in the post-colonial 
period. While in Indonesian case, instead of providing positive contribution for 
economic development, Dutch colonial legacy inherited “the ethnic division of labor”, 
which resulted in ethnic disparities in income and wealth, and also rent-seeking 
activity, which eventually hindered economic development process in the post-
colonial period. Second, Korea’s geopolitical situation and international politics, 
which resulted in tremendous the U.S aid also, contributed to the success of Korean 
economic development.  
Another findings, by analyzing the role of the state, show that the different 
result of Korea and Indonesia’s economic development was due to several reasons. 
First, the political leadership commitment to economic development in Indonesian 
case was only a political jargon and was not followed by the concrete executive action 
as found in Korea. Second, Indonesia did not have a rational and competent 
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bureaucracy as Korea had. Rather it had a rent-seeking bureaucracy. Third, the 
military in Indonesia has an enormous role not only in politics but also in the 
economy, while this condition does not appear in the Korean case.  
In sum, Korea’s economic development is better than that of Indonesia’s 
because Korea consistently follows the expectation of developmental state argument, 
while Indonesia does not. In this context, MacIntyre writes: 
“…countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia comprise an 
intermediate case between the strong developmental state of Northeast 
Asia…and the notorious “klepto-patrimonial” regimes of Africa such 
as Nigeria or Zaire. Their governments are not hopelessly captured and 
corrupt, but on the other hand they are frequently beholden to sectional 
interest groups, and tainted by nepotism and cronyism. Nevertheless 
the Malaysian, Thai, and Indonesian governments have been capable 
of coherent policy formulation and implementation in the face of 
external shocks, and have thus been able to maintain the momentum of 
growth over several decades. In this they resemble Taiwan and South 
Korea to a greater extent than regimes in other parts of the developing 
world” (MacIntyre in Booth: 1998). 
 
Nevertheless, the financial crisis of 1997 placed the effectiveness of state’s 
role in economic development into question. The financial crisis started from the 
massive run on the Thai bath in July 1997 were quickly replicated with variations, in 
several neighboring countries, such as, Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, and 
Philippines. Within several months, three of these countries—Thailand, Indonesia, 
and Korea—had petitioned the IMF for complex financial assistance packages 
(Pempel, 1999: p.1). It is not surprising; then, the aftermath of this crisis jeopardized 
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the Asian Miracle. As a result, the developmental state model as the way of the Asian 
miracle to achieve the remarkable economic growth has been criticized as a 
significant cause of the crisis. 
 Since then, there have been numerous critics on the developmental state 
model, which are mostly rooted in the excessive state intervention in economic 
development. As Burkett and Landsberg point out developmental state requires an 
unusually autonomous state, both internally and vis-à-vis other state and multilateral 
organizations (Burkett and Landsberg, 2000: p. 17). In this sense, the intensifying of 
globalization and the force of democratization can be regarded as external and internal 
challenge of the developmental state model.  
Globalization usually refers to the advancement of technology, the 
intensification of capital flow, and the deepening of relationship between nation-states. 
As Samuel Kim argues globalization is a set of processes of stretching and 
intensifying worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of human relations and 
transaction—economic, social, cultural, environmental, political, diplomatic, and 
security—such that events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world have 
immediate consequences for individuals, groups, and states, in other parts of the 
world (Samuel Kim (ed.), 2000: p. 18). That is why; in the fact of contemporary 
globalization, as Gereffi mentions, the role of the state in economic development has 
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become more problematic (Gereffi (in Chan, Clark, Lam, eds., 2000): p. 56-57). The 
intensification of globalization has made the state’s ability to intervene in the 
economic development become limited. The intensification of globalization has 
pushed the state to become more liberal or open to the international market force. 
Besides the external challenge through the intensification of globalization, 
the force of democratization also challenged the developmental state model. In the 
previous part, the writer has already explained that political stability and social 
discipline was an important pre-condition for pursuing economic growth. In this 
regard, authoritarianism was believed to be the best way to maintain political stability 
and social discipline or state cohesion. Thus, in this sense, domestic political 
democratization could undermine state cohesion and independence of action (Burkett 
and Landsberg, 2000: p. 17). 
The discussion on the challenge of democratization toward the 
developmental state model also relates with the discussion on the conceptualization of 
the state in the developmental state argument. Chan et.al argues the conceptualization 
of the state in developmental state itself appears overly simplistic. The developmental 
state model failed to uncover the complex and dynamic internal workings of the state 
structure by depicting the state as an internally cohesive unitary actor, and it also 
commits the fallacy of reductionism by equating the state with bureaucrats.  
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However, the state structure is not an internally coherent, unitary entity, but 
is composed of several distinguishable dimensions: executive leadership, executive-
bureaucratic nexus, intra-bureaucratic dynamics and bureaucratic constituents. The 
cohesion, unity, and dominance of state structure depend on the combination of these 
dimensions (Chan, Clark, Lam, eds., 1998: p. 10-11). In this regard, Eun Mee Kim 
points out that democratization signifies openness to and tolerance of divergent 
groups and their demand. The state is thus challenged to negotiate and bargain with 
such groups (Eun Mee Kim, 1991: p. 47 – 48). 
In the case of Korea and Indonesia, both countries showed that the 
intensification of globalization and democratization challenged the intervention of the 
state in economic development. In the occurrence of globalization, the most serious 
threat comes from the United State government, the IMF, and the World Bank, all of 
which demand that the East Asian countries liberalize their economies (Burkett and 
Landsberg, 2000: p. 17).  
Meanwhile, concerning the force of democratization, in both cases, the most 
serious threat comes from the unfortunate part of the people (particularly labor class 
in Korean case) who have been neglected during the process of economic 
development. The choice of “growth first, distribution later” strategy resulted in the 
wide gap of social inequalities. In this regard, borrowing the argument of Hun Joo 
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Park, the problem of declining social cohesion, which resulted from lack of state 
intervention to the lives or opinions of ordinary citizen, was a part of dysfunctional of 
developmental state or (the) disease of dirigisme38.  
In Indonesian case, as the impact of the emergence of democratization, the 
demand from the local government to become more autonomous from the central 
government is increasing. In this sense, the centralized power or top-downism, which 
has been implemented more than thirty years, seems no longer effective. 
Democratization, thus, forced the state to be more responsive to the demand of civil 
society. In other words, following Hun Joo Park’s argument, as the political economic 
system grew more complex and the body politic gained confidence beyond carrying 
out the production orders, top-downism outgrew its usefulness and hindered flexible 
innovation and change.39   
Obviously, the intensification of globalization and the force of 
democratization have put the effectiveness of developmental state into question. 
However, it does not mean that the writer is advocating the free-market solution 
approach, which is requiring “no state intervention”, and “opening or liberalizing the 
market”. On the contrary, the writer has faith in the importance of the role of the state 
                                                          
38  Hun Joo Park, “Globalization, National Identity, and the Changing Role of the State”, paper 
presented on International Program on Korea’s Economic Development and Policy Assignment in 
Transition Economies, held by Center for Knowledge Partnership, KDI School, September 16-24, 2001, 
p. 3. 
39 Hun Joo Park, “The Problematique: Faulted Korean Statism”, in Dirigiste Development as Disease: 
The Political Sources of Financial Policy toward Small Busines”, (forthcoming).  
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in the economic development process.  
Following the argument of Hun Joo Park, constructing and institutionalizing 
a new, transparent, accountable, consensus building, and radically and viably 
decentralized public policy making process and thereby making the government more 
honest, upright, and fair as well as kinder, gentler, and smarter (Hun Joo Park: 
forthcoming) can be seen as a basic idea to revise the developmental state argument. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: The Military-Owned Business Group in Indonesia40 
Company Principal Activities 
KOSTRAD (Komando Strategy Angkatan Darat, Army Strategic Reserve Command) 
Yayasan Darma Putra Kostrad Holding Company 
Pakarti Yoga Holding Company 
Astra Basic Industries Trading 
Dharma Kencana Sakti Trading 
Federal Dinamika Lestari Trading 
Marga Bharata Trading 
Hela Nusantara Cemerlang Forestry 
Pakarti Wanayoga Forestry 
Tirta Mukti Indah Bottling Co. Food and Beverages 
Aica Indonesia Chemical 
Tokai Dharma Indonesia Other 
Wira Karya Yoga Construction 
Dharma Karya Persada Real Industry Estate 
Pakarti Tata Real Industry Estate 
Pen Asia Express Lines Real Industry Estate 
Asuransi Beringin Sejahtera Finance/Insurance 
Asuransi Wahana Tata Finance/Insurance 
Indosuez Indonesia Bank Finance 
  
KOPASSUS (Komando Pasukan Khusus, Army Special Force Command) 
Yayasan Kobame Holding Company 
KMP Tribuana Transportation 
Kobame Kopertindo Other  
  
MABES ABRI (Markas Besar ABRI, ABRI’s headquarter) 
Yayasan Mabes ABRI (Yamabri) Holding Company 
Yamabri Dwibakti, PT Utama Highway Construction 
Balai Sudirman Other 
Primasel, PT Telecommunication 
Manunggal Air Service, PT Other 
Joint with PT Elang Mahkota Internet Services Provider 
  
DEPHANKAM (Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan, Ministry of Defense and 
Security) 
Bank Yudha Bakti Finance 
Asabri, Yayasan Sudirman, Yayasan Maju Kerja Other 
  
The Army  
Kartika Eka Paksi Foundation Holding Company 
Kartika Plaza Hotel Tourism/Hotel 
Orchid Palace Hotel Tourism/Hotel 
Duta Kartika Kencana Tours & Travel Tours and Travel 
Kartika Aneka Usaha General Trading 
Kartika Buana Niaga Export – Import 
Duta Kartika Cargo Service Cargo 
Kartika Cipta Sarana Construction 
Mina Kartika Samudera Fishery 
                                                          
40 This table only presents the involvement of military in business as an institution. There are lots more 
involvement of the military in business as the individual. For further information, see Indria Samego 
(et.al.), Bila ABRI Berbisnis (The involvement of military in Business), 1998 and Iswandi, Bisnis 
Militer Orde Baru (The New Order Military Business), 1998. 
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Rimba Kartika Raya Timber 
Mitra Kartika Sejati Shrimp 
Kartika Inti Perkasa Holding Company 
Mahkota Transndo Indah Holding Company 
Tri Usaha Bhakti Holding Company 
Aerokarto Indonesia, PT Air Service 
Aerotografia Pratama, PT Air Service 
Indomas Pratamacitra, PT Air Service 
Mandala Dirgantara, PT Air Service 
Asiagraha Securindo, PT Finance 
Asuransi Cigna Indonesia Finance/Insurance 
Private Development Finance, Co. Finance 
Bank Artha Graha, PT Finance 
Bank PDCFI, PT Finance 
Danayasa Arthatama, PT Finance 
Cilegon Fabricators, PT Metal Product (Supplier) 
Purna Sadhana, PT Metal Product 
Saksi Sakti, PT Metal Product 
Truba Gatra Perkasa, PT Metal Product 
Bakti Wira Husada, PT Trading 
Kartika Paksi Perkasa, PT Trading 
Prasada Samya Mukti, PT Trading 
Sinkona Indonesia Lestari, PT Trading 
Kultujaya Tri Usaha, PT Trading 
Lukita Wahanasari, PT Trading 
Indotruba Barat, PT Plantation 
Indotruba Tengah, PT Plantation 
Indoruba Timur, PT Plantation 
Karko Kultura Utama Fishery 
Minamulia Djaya Bhakti Fishery 
International Timber Group, PT Forestry 
Sumber Mas Timber, PT Forestry 
Sumber Mas Indonesia, PT Forestry 
Taliabu Lina Timber, PT Forestry 
Kayan River Indah Timber Plywood, PT Wood 
Kayan River Timber Product, PT Wood 
Meranti Sakti Indah Plywood, PT Wood 
Panca Usaha Palopo Plywood, PT Wood 
International Timber Corp. Indonesia (ITCI), PT Wood 
Truba Anugerah Elektronik, PT Manufacturing 
Truba Gatra Pekrasa, PT Manufacturing 
Truba Sadaya Industri, PT Manufacturing 
Truba Raya Trading, PT Textiles 
Sinkoma Indonesia Lestari, PT Pharmaceutical 
Truba Daya Konstruksi, PT Construction 
Truba Jatipurna Eng. Construction 
Truba Jurong Eng., PT Construction 
Truba Jurong Eng., Pte., Ltd. Construction 
Truba Inti Development, PT Real Industrial Estate 
Pondok Indah Padang Golf, PT Real Industrial Estate 
Sempati Air, PT Transportation 
Universitas Ahmad Yani, Bandung Education 
Private Development Finance Co. Ofina Finance 
  
The Navy 
Yayasan Bhumyamca Holding Company 
Admiral Lines Shipping 
Jasa Bhakti Yasbhum Other 
Sekolah-sekolah Hang Tuah Education 
Bhumiyamca Film Other 
    65
Karimun Kecil Oil 
Bank Bahari Finance 
Pelayanan Nusantara Bahari Finance 
Bintan Beach International Resort Tourism/Resort 
Pulau Bayan Marina Club Tourism 
Marintour Ina Tourism 
Yala Gada, PT Trading 
Yala Trade Trading 
Yala Trading Trading  
Yala Ladang Kurnia Trading 
Sangkuliang Bhakti Wood 
Sangkuliang Forestry 
Samudera Gunadharma Construction 
Yala Nautika Construction 
Yala Perkasa International Construction 
Yala Persada Angkasa Construction 
Bhumiyamca Sekawan Property-office/Shopping 
Centre 
Adhini Barna Lines Transportation 
Jasa Transportasi Yala Githa Transportation 
PBM Adhi Gunung Persada Transportation 
PBM Bintang Upaya Samudera Transportation 
Halmahera Kayu Forestry 
  
The Air Force 
Yayaysan Adi Upaya Holding Company 
Bank Angkasa Finance 
Dirgantara Air Service Cargo 
Angkasa Pura Aero Service 
Cargo Dirgantara Cargo Ground Handling 
Mediarona Dirgantara, PT Publisher 
Kreshna Puri Dirgantara, PT Telecommunication, 
general trading 
Konstruksi Dirgantara, PT Engineering 
Uoaya Guna Dirgantara, PT Cargo 
Padang Golf Halim, PT Property 
Surya Dirgantara, PT Transportation 
Angkasa Wana, PT Forestry 
Jasa Angkasa Semesta, PT Aero Service 
  
The Police 
Yayasan Bhayangkara Holding Company 
Yayasan Brata Bhakti Holding Company 
Tansa Trisna, PT General Trading, Wood, 
Chemistry, Shrimp 
Bhara Induk, PT Textiles, Forestry 
Braja Tara, PT Transportation 
Bhara Union, PT General Trading 
Braja Tama, PT General Trading, Forestry, 
Plantation, Hotel 
Asuransi Bhakti Bhayangkara, PT Finance/Insurance 
Sapta Pursa Mandiri, PT Finance/Insurance 
Bank Yudha Bhakti Finance 
Gedung Bimantara Property 
 
 
Source: Modified from Susanto and Supriatma, ABRI Siasat Kebudayaan 1945-
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1995 (Cultural Deception of ABRI 1945 – 1995), Penerbit Kanisius-Lembaga Studi 
Realino, Yogyakarta, 1995 and 
http://www.munindo.brd.de/artikel/artikel_02/artikel_02.html  
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Appendix B: Major Business Conglomerates in Indonesia 
 
Ranking Conglomerate Principal 
Ownera 
Principal 
activities 
Turn-over 
Rpb 1993 1987b 
Number of 
Companies 
1993 
Salim Liem Sioe Liong Cement, 
finance, 
autos, agro-
industry 
18,000 1 1 450 
Astra Prasetia Mulya 
Group and 
public 
Autos, estates 5,890 2 2 205 
Lippo Mochtar Riady Finance 4,750 3 4 78 
Sinar Mas Eka Tjipta 
Widjaja 
Agro-
Industry, pulp 
and paper, 
finance 
4,200 4 3 150 
Gudang Garam Rachman Halim Kretek 
cigarettes 
3,600 5 5 6 
Bob Hasan Bob Hasan, Sigit 
Harjojudanto s 
Timber, 
estates 
3,400 6 12 92 
Barito Pacific Prajogo 
Pangestu 
Timber 3,050 7 26 92 
Bimantara Bambang 
Trihatmodjo s 
Trade, real 
estate, 
chemicals 
3,000 8 13 134 
Argo 
Manunggal 
The Ning King Textiles 2,940 9 15 54 
Dharmala Seohargo 
Gondokusumo 
Agro-
industry, real 
estate 
2,530 10 14 151 
Djarum Budi and 
Micahel Hartono
Kretek 
cigarettes 
2,360 11 6 25 
Ongko Kaharuddun 
Ongko 
Real estate, 
finance 
2,100 12 11 59 
Panin Mu’min Ali 
Gunawan 
Finance 2,080 13 10 43 
Rodamas Tan Siong Kie Chemicals 2,000 14 18 41 
Surya Raya Soeryadjaya Property, 
estates, trade 
1,980 15 n.a. 242 
Jan Darmadi Jan Darmadi Real estate 1,940 16 9 60 
CCM/Berca Murdaya 
Widyawimarta 
Poo 
Electronics, 
electricity 
1,800 17 n.a. 32 
Humpus Hutomo 
Mandala Putra s 
Oil, trade, 
chemicals 
1,750 18 23 11 
Gadjah 
Tunggal 
Sjamsul 
Nursalim 
Tyres, 
finance, real 
estate 
1,650 19 24 49 
Raja Garuda 
Mas 
Sukanto Tanoto Pulp and 
rayon, finance
1,590 20 34 66 
Gemala Wanandi Chemicals, 
autos 
1,550 21 7 78 
Pembangunan 
Jaya 
Several Real estate 1,390 22 n.a. 57 
Metropolitan Several Real estate 1,200 23 n.a. 57 
Soedarpo Soedarpo 
Sastrosatomo p 
Shipping, 
trade, 
1,200 23 16 35 
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pharmaceutic
als 
Tahija Julius Tahija p Finance 1,200 23 n.a. 39 
 
a In some cases owned by the family of this individual. ‘P’ denotes pribumi ownership; 
otherwise the conglomerate is majority or solely non-pribumi owned. ‘S’ denotes Soeharto’s 
son (italic added). 
b n.a. indicates the conglomerate was not ranked in the top 40 in 1987. 
 
Source: Hill. The Indonesian Economy Since 1966, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996, p. 111. 
 
Appendix C: Cabinet Members of Military Background (% in the whole cabinet 
members) in Korea 
 
Rhee Gov 
(1948 – 60) 
Jang Gov 
(1960 – 61) 
Park Gov 1 
(1963 – 71) 
Park Gov 2 
(1973 – 79) 
Chun Gov 
(1980 – 86) 
Roh Gov 
(1987 – 93) 
5.1 0 35.4 31.7 24.5 14.7 
 
Source: Kie-Duck Park, “Civil-Military Relations in Korea”, in 
http://www.pdgs.org/partners/korea.htm 
 
Appendix D: Congressmen of Military Background (% in whole Congress) in 
Korea 
 
Congress Percentage Congress Percentage 
1st Cong.(1948 – 50) 0 9th Cong. (1973 – 79) 22.4 
2nd Cong. (1950 – 54) 1.0 10th Cong. (1979 – 80) 16.0 
3rd Cong. (1954 – 58) 2.4 11th Cong. (1981 – 85) 9.4 
4th Cong. (1958 – 60) 2.1 12th Cong. (1985 – 88) 12.9 
5th Cong. (1960 – 61) 4.2 13th Cong. (1988 – 92) 6.0 
6th Cong. (1963 – 67) 17.7 14th Cong. (1992 – 96) 15.0 
7th Cong. (1967 – 71) 21.1  15th Cong. (1996 – ) 5.0 
8th Cong. (1971 – 72) 17.2   
 
Source: Kie-Duck Park, “Civil-Military Relations in Korea”, in 
http://www.pdgs.org/partners/korea.htm 
 
Appendix E: Members of People’s Consultative Assembly Based on Fraction in 
Indonesia 
 
Period Military Karya 
Pembangunan
PDI PPP Region Total 
    69
1972 – 1977 230 392 42 126 130 920 
1977 – 1982 230 381 39 131 139 920 
1982 – 1987 230 395 32 123 140 920 
1987 – 1992 151 548 61 93 147 1000 
1992 – 1997 150 524 84 93 149 1000 
 
Source: http://www.mpr.go.id 
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